Burgess v. State
2016 Ark. 175
Ark.2016Background
- Burgess pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor and three felonies; as part of felony probation he was ordered to serve 120 days in the Pulaski County Jail as a condition of probation.
- After two separate revocation proceedings (he pleaded guilty to the revocation petitions), the circuit court sentenced Burgess to 36 months’ imprisonment on the felonies.
- At sentencing there was a dispute over jail-time credit; the court awarded 31 days (time between arrest and final hearing) but denied credit for the earlier 120 days served as a condition of probation.
- Burgess appealed, arguing entitlement to credit under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-404 and § 16-93-309(c); the State argued those statutes apply only to pretrial custody or to time served following an earlier revocation.
- The Supreme Court considered whether Burgess could appeal after a guilty plea on this nonjurisdictional sentencing-credit issue and then interpreted the relevant statutes de novo.
- The majority affirmed denial of credit, holding § 5-4-404 applies to pretrial custody (or custody that directly resulted in the sentence) and § 16-93-309(c) applies only to credit for confinement after an earlier revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Burgess’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Burgess may appeal denial of jail-time credit after pleading guilty | Appeal proper because challenge is to the legality of the sentence (postjudgment) | Appeal improper if credit denial was integral to plea acceptance; no postjudgment motion filed | Appeal permitted: request was not integral to plea acceptance and mostly litigated later |
| Whether Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-404 requires credit for 120 days served as condition of probation | § 5-4-404 entitles credit for time held in custody for conduct that resulted in sentence, including confinement as a probation condition | Statute covers pretrial custody/ incarceration that directly resulted in the later sentence; not confinement imposed merely as a probation condition served earlier | Held § 5-4-404 inapplicable; applies to pretrial or custody that directly led to the sentence, not prior probation-condition confinement |
| Whether § 16-93-309(c) requires credit for 120 days served earlier | § 16-93-309(c) provides credit for time served due to an original revocation | Statute applies only where a subsequent revocation leads to imprisonment and credits time from an earlier (original) revocation | Held § 16-93-309(c) inapplicable because Burgess’s 120 days preceded any revocation and was a probation condition, not confinement from an original revocation |
| Net legal effect: entitlement to credit against new sentence for earlier confinement | Burgess: should receive 120 days credit against 36-month sentence | State: only 31 days (pre-sentencing custody) are creditable | Court affirmed denial of 120-day credit; only pretrial/continuous custody tied to the conviction is creditable |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. State, 301 Ark. 510 (explaining appealable sentencing-credit claims after guilty plea)
- Sherman v. State, 303 Ark. 284 (distinguishing when sentencing matters are integral to plea acceptance)
- Allen v. State, 294 Ark. 209 (construing predecessor to § 5-4-404: credit for pretrial incarceration that resulted in conviction)
- Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83 (jail-time credit appropriate for pretrial incarceration tied to the charged conduct)
- Owens v. State, 370 Ark. 421 (courts avoid interpretations producing absurd results)
- Walters v. State, 267 Ark. 155 (credit applied after retrial when pretrial custody related to the conviction)