2018 Ohio 4408
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Collin Burchard, a 19-year-old developmentally disabled Dale Roy School student with history of seizures, stroke, and impaired thermoregulation, allegedly participated in gym activities on Aug. 25, 2016 that caused heat-related injury contrary to his IEP.
- School staff/aide noticed Collin was unwell but did not obtain medical treatment; he was later transported home on a bus without air conditioning, found in distress by family, and taken to the hospital.
- Collin’s IEP and a teacher-completed "Focus Form" documenting his medical needs were not properly shared with nursing and transportation departments; no Emergency Care Plan was developed.
- Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities substantiated neglect and issued recommendations after investigating the school’s handling of the incident.
- Plaintiffs (Collin and his mother Catherine) sued the Ashland County Board of Developmental Disabilities (and Ashland County) for negligent retention/supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and loss of consortium; the trial court dismissed Ashland County but denied the Board’s motion to dismiss.
- The Board appealed, arguing it is entitled to sovereign immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744; the appellate court reviewed de novo and reversed the trial court, finding immunity applicable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Board is entitled to sovereign immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 | Burchard argued exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) remove immunity for negligent supervision/retention and IIED | Board argued broad immunity applies and none of the statutory exceptions apply | Court held Board entitled to immunity; complaint fails to plead facts to overcome immunity |
| Whether IIED claims fall within exceptions to immunity | IIED claims seek recovery for emotional harm from alleged conduct | Board argued intentional torts like IIED remain immune under controlling precedent | Court held IIED claims barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed them |
| Whether negligent retention/supervision is a proprietary function under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) | Burchard argued hiring/retention/supervision are proprietary, thus exception applies | Board argued hiring/retention for operating a developmental disabilities facility is part of a governmental function | Court held supervision/retention are integral to operation of the facility (a governmental function), so the proprietary exception does not apply |
| Whether loss of consortium claim survives if primary claims fail | Catherine urged derivative consortium claim based on son’s alleged injuries | Board maintained derivative claim depends on primary causes of action that are barred | Court held loss of consortium fails as derivative claim and is dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228 (Ohio 1990) (standard of review for motion to dismiss)
- Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56 (Ohio 1991) (accept allegations as true on Rule 12(B)(6))
- York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143 (Ohio 1991) (standard for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6))
- Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24 (Ohio 1998) (three-tiered analysis of political subdivision immunity)
- Wilson v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Human Serv., 70 Ohio St.3d 450 (Ohio 1994) (intentional infliction of emotional distress is not an exception to sovereign immunity)
- Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451 (Ohio 2002) (IIED and sovereign immunity)
- Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266 (Ohio 2007) (analysis of immunity tiers and reinstatement defenses)