Buntion v. State
2016 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 15
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2016Background
- Appellant Carl Wayne Buntion was convicted of capital murder (June 1990) for killing a police officer; jury sentenced him to death after a 2012 punishment retrial following a resentencing remand.
- The jury answered the statutory special issues including future dangerousness in the affirmative; trial judge imposed death under Article 37.0711.
- Buntion raised 27 points of error on automatic direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed.
- Key contested topics on appeal included: sufficiency of evidence to support future-dangerousness finding; whether a juror (Kotsatos) was mentally unfit; pretrial publicity/DA conduct and change-of-venue; denial of various challenges for cause and loss of peremptory strikes; evidentiary rulings (exclusion of Rule 404(b) notices and alleged out-of-record remarks); and denial of a request to instruct the jury on life without parole.
- The court applied settled Texas standards for reviewing future-dangerousness predictions and voir dire/challenge-for-cause rulings, giving deference to the trial judge’s assessments of demeanor and credibility.
Issues
| Issue | Buntion’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for future dangerousness | Evidence insufficient: Buntion is old, in poor health, long clean disciplinary record in prison, no expert opinion showing risk | Jury may rely on offense facts, lack of remorse, long violent criminal history, unadjudicated bad acts, prison-gang membership, and letters; view evidence in light most favorable to verdict | Affirmed — facts of the murder, post-offense violence, lack of remorse, prior record and other conduct supported a rational finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he posed a continuing threat |
| Juror disability (Kristi Kotsatos) | Kotsatos was psychologically unable to serve; should have been excused under Art. 36.29 | Kotsatos repeatedly said she could follow law and consider evidence; defense accepted juror and failed to preserve complaint | Overruled — no timely challenge for cause or objection preserved; trial court within discretion to retain juror |
| Pretrial publicity / DA conduct / change of venue | DA Lykos’ media statement about parole and subsequent media attention prejudiced venire; DA’s office should be disqualified or venue changed | Coverage was not pervasive, was largely accurate/objective; no evidence DA had actual conflict or misconduct affecting this case; voir dire explored publicity | Overruled — trial court did not abuse discretion denying change of venue, subpoenas, or disqualification; publicity not shown to be prejudicial |
| Evidentiary rulings: admission of other-inmate materials and prosecutor argument | Defense should have been allowed to introduce State’s Rule 404(b) notices from another inmate (Davis) to rebut prosecutor impressions; prosecutor made impermissible out-of-record argument | Notices from other cases are hearsay and inadmissible; trial court allowed defense witnesses and limited scope; no preserved objection to some argument | Overruled — exclusion of pleadings/404(b) notices was within discretion (hearsay/403); no shown improper jury argument causing reversible error |
| Denied challenges for cause / exhaustion of peremptories | Multiple veniremembers were biased (police ties, death-penalty views, parole concern); denial forced use of peremptories and acceptance of objectionable juror(s) | Voir dire responses showed jurors could follow law; trial judge observed demeanor; appellant used peremptories and received two extra strikes; to show harm must prove error as to three challenged jurors | Overruled — trial court did not abuse discretion in denying challenges for cause as to the contested venirepersons; appellant failed to establish reversible harm |
| Motion to include life without parole / ex post facto waiver request | Buntion sought to waive Article 37.0711 parole eligibility and have jury instructed life without parole (as under later law) | Sentencing law in effect at offense controls; court cannot apply a statutory scheme that by its terms doesn’t apply; allowing elective change would raise legal problems | Overruled — trial court properly applied sentencing scheme in effect at time of offense; no structural error shown; remedy (if any) is legislative |
Key Cases Cited
- Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (future-dangerousness evidentiary context)
- Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (standard for reviewing sufficiency on future-dangerousness)
- Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (factors juries may consider on continuing-threat finding)
- Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (offense facts may alone support future-dangerousness)
- McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (limits of predicting future dangerousness)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1985) (standard for juror bias and challenge for cause)
- Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (harm analysis when challenges for cause erroneously denied)
- Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (review of challenge-for-cause rulings; deference to trial court on demeanor)
- Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (disqualification standard for elected district attorney)
- Gonzalez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (change-of-venue and pretrial publicity)
- Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (publicity must be pervasive, prejudicial, inflammatory to require venue change)