Bunting v. Kellogg's Corporation
3:14-cv-00621
D. Conn.May 2, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Lenworth Bunting, proceeding pro se, sued Kellogg’s and manager Michael Goss alleging race discrimination (Title VII) and age discrimination (ADEA) after he was not hired as Warehouse Manager.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Bunting was less qualified than the selected external hire, Bradley Linnell.
- On September 30, 2016, the Court granted summary judgment: it held Bunting failed to show pretext for discriminatory motivation as to Title VII, dismissed the ADEA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and ruled Title VII does not permit individual liability against Goss.
- Bunting filed a Rule 60 motion seeking relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect for failing to submit an affidavit earlier and alleging defendants made fraudulent/misleading statements in their summary judgment submissions (including a contested declaration and TALEO records).
- The Court treated the Rule 60 motion as raising alleged mistakes and alleged fraud, considered supplemental filings by Bunting, and evaluated the motion under the standards for Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(3).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) (excusable neglect / omitted affidavit) | Bunting says he failed to submit a supporting affidavit and citations because he didn’t understand procedures; seeks reconsideration. | Defendants argue no new evidence or legal basis; motion is an improper attempt to relitigate. | Denied — affidavit did not supply evidence of racial motivation or otherwise alter summary judgment result; no intervening law or new material evidence. |
| Relief under Rule 60(b)(3) (fraud/misrepresentation) | Bunting alleges defendants presented false facts, a false declaration, and inaccurate TALEO records that prevented fair presentation. | Defendants deny fraud; argue Bunting offers no clear and convincing proof of material misrepresentations. | Denied — allegations, even if true, would not be material to overcome lack of evidence of discriminatory intent; no clear and convincing proof. |
| Title VII (pretext / discriminatory intent) — underlying summary judgment issue | Bunting points to procedural irregularities in hiring and company practice favoring internal applicants as evidence of discrimination. | Kellogg’s points to superior qualifications of Linnell and consistent hiring record; no record evidence showing race motivated the decision. | Summary judgment for defendants — no genuine issue that Kellogg’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (Linnell’s qualifications) was pretextual. |
| ADEA claim / individual liability | Bunting asserted age discrimination and named Goss individually. | Defendants argued ADEA claim not administratively exhausted; Title VII claims cannot impose individual liability. | ADEA claim dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; individual Title VII liability against Goss rejected as a matter of law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (equitable excusable neglect factors)
- Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62 (Rule 60(b) discretionary standard)
- Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132 (Rule 60(b) extraordinary relief / exceptional circumstances)
- Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123 (Rule 60(b) relief is discretionary)
- Canfield v. Van Atta Buick/GMC Truck, Inc., 127 F.3d 248 (when neglect may be excusable)
- State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158 (Rule 60(b)(3) — fraud must have prevented fair presentation)
- Fleming v. N.Y. Univ., 865 F.2d 478 (clear and convincing evidence required for Rule 60(b)(3))
- Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (summary judgment standard in discrimination cases re: pretext)
- Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255 (strict standard for reconsideration)
- Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (standards for reconsideration / grounds for relief)
- Matura v. United States, 189 F.R.D. 86 (pro se pleadings given more lenient reading on Rule 60 motions)
