Buntin v. City of Boston
209 F. Supp. 3d 368
D. Mass.2016Background
- Jeannette Buntin, administratrix of Oswald Hixon’s estate, sued the City of Boston and two DPW supervisors after Hixon’s February 2011 termination, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983.
- The district court previously dismissed the § 1981 claim for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies, and dismissed parts of the § 1983 claim as time-barred; the First Circuit reversed the § 1981 dismissal, holding § 1981 has no administrative-exhaustion requirement.
- Discovery concluded and the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the remaining federal claim (§ 1981) and related issues.
- Defendants argued § 1981 does not provide a private right of action against state actors (i.e., Jett forecloses an independent § 1981 remedy where § 1983 exists).
- The court evaluated whether the 1991 amendments to § 1981 (subsection (c)) implicitly created a private cause of action against state actors or overruled Jett.
- Having resolved the federal question against plaintiff, the court denied plaintiff’s summary judgment, granted defendants’ summary judgment on the § 1981 claim, dismissed official-capacity claims against individual supervisors, and remanded state-law claims to Superior Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1981 provides an independent private cause of action against state actors after the 1991 amendments | § 1981(c) extended protection "under color of State law," thereby creating a private right against state actors | Jett controls: § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for alleged state-actor violations; § 1981(c) defines rights, not remedies | Court held § 1981(c) does not overrule Jett; § 1983 remains the exclusive remedy against state actors |
| Whether Congress’s 1991 amendments manifest intent to abrogate Jett | Congress intended to restore/expand § 1981 rights including against state action | Silence regarding Jett and statutory language show no clear congressional intent to override Jett | Court found no clear congressional intent to repeal or abrogate Jett by implication |
| Whether permitting § 1981 suits would undermine § 1983 limitations policy | N/A (implicit: plaintiff seeks to proceed under § 1981 where § 1983 claims may be time-barred) | Allowing § 1981 suits would effectively nullify § 1983’s shorter limitations period | Court noted pragmatic concern: § 1981’s longer limitations period cannot be used to circumvent § 1983 time bar |
| Whether individual-capacity official defendants could be sued in lieu of a municipal § 1981 remedy | Plaintiff named supervisors and sought relief against them | Official-capacity suits are equivalent to suits against the municipality; no separate individual-capacity claim pleaded | Court dismissed official-capacity claims against individual supervisors as duplicative of the municipal claim and thus dismissed them |
Key Cases Cited
- Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (where § 1983 provides an express remedy for state-actor deprivations, courts should not imply a separate § 1981 remedy against state actors)
- Buntin v. City of Boston, 813 F.3d 401 (1st Cir. 2015) (First Circuit reversed dismissal of § 1981 claim on pleading/exhaustion grounds)
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (official-capacity suit is a suit against the office/municipality, not the individual)
- Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918) (distinction between rights and remedies)
- Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497 (1936) (statutory repeal by implication requires clear and manifest intent)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time)
- Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (discussion of implying remedies where no alternative remedy exists)