Buntin v. City of Boston
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22771
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- Hixon, Black, employed by City of Boston as a mechanic; Hixon’s supervisors were white (Alther and McGonagle).
- Hixon failed a 2007 random drug/alcohol test, placed on probation, and required counseling; he alleged the test was race-based.
- Feb 4–10, 2011: Hixon received a written warning, was suspended, and then terminated for alleged drug/alcohol policy violations.
- Hixon’s administrative remedies included MCAD proceedings; MCAD dismissed his 2013 charge as untimely; Hixon died in 2014; Buntin became administratrix in 2014.
- Buntin filed suit on February 6, 2015 in Massachusetts Superior Court on behalf of the estate, asserting federal and state claims (notably 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1983).
- District court dismissed the federal claims for lack of exhaustion (1981) and failure to state a claim (1983); on appeal, issues were reexamined de novo and in light of governing statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1981 claims require administrative exhaustion. | Buntin alleges §1981 does not require MCAD exhaustion. | Defendants contend exhaustion applies under Title VII framework. | §1981 does not require administrative exhaustion; reversal of dismissal on this basis. |
| Whether §1981 claim was timely filed under the four-year statute of limitations. | Claim filed within four years of the February 2011 acts. | Limitations began on February 4, 2011. | Claim timely filed; accrual based on notice of discriminatory acts, not merely the warning. |
| Whether the §1981 pleadings were sufficient to withstand dismissal. | Alleges specific facts of discriminatory acts and retaliation. | Pleadings allegedly conclusory or vague. | Pleadings constitute specific, factual allegations plausibly supporting §1981 claims. |
| Whether §1983 claim premised on suspension/termination is time-barred. | Could be timely if based on 2013 name-clearing theories. | Claims based on 2011 termination are untimely; name-clearing theory lacks elements. | §1983 claim based on 2011 events barred by statute; name-clearing theory fails on elements. |
| Whether the name-clearing hearing theory under §1983 is viable. | Alters status and defamation required a hearing; there was a potential denial. | No defamatory statements tied to employment alteration or denial of hearing. | Name-clearing theory fails; no adequate basis for §1983 claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Aly v. Mohegan Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 711 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2013) (exhaustion not required for §1981; Title VII exhaustion differs)
- Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2007) (§1981 does not require administrative exhaustion)
- Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (name-clearing due process requires opportunity to dispute defamatory statements)
- Burton v. Town of Littleton, 426 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2005) (failure to provide name-clearing hearing can be actionable under §1983)
- Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2015) (pleading standards; plausible claims required for §1981/§1983)
- Shervin v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 804 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2015) (context on accrual and related procedural issues)