Buie v. District of Columbia
273 F. Supp. 3d 65
D.D.C.2017Background
- Plaintiff Jaquia Buie alleges she was sexually assaulted on December 3, 2014 by MPD officer Darrell L. Best, who picked her up in an unmarked police vehicle while in full uniform and armed, drove her to a restaurant, then to MPD headquarters where the assault occurred. Best later pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 years.
- Plaintiff sued the District of Columbia and Mayor Muriel E. Bowser (among others) asserting negligence, negligent entrustment/retention, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and related claims.
- The District and Mayor Bowser moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss in part, arguing (1) no viable theory of liability was alleged as to Mayor Bowser, and (2) the District cannot be vicariously liable because Best acted outside the scope of employment.
- The court treated plaintiff’s factual allegations as true for the motion-to-dismiss stage and applied the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard.
- The court dismissed Mayor Bowser (official-capacity claims were duplicative of the District) but denied dismissal as to the District on respondeat superior grounds, finding plaintiff plausibly alleged liability under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) because Best allegedly used instrumentalities of his position (uniform, police vehicle, secured HQ access) to accomplish the tort.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mayor Bowser should remain a defendant | Claims against Bowser simply mirror those against the District; dismissal not necessary but acceptable | Bowser named only in official capacity and claims duplicate the District | Dismissed — official-capacity claims against Bowser are duplicative of the District |
| Whether the District is vicariously liable under respondeat superior because Best acted outside scope of employment | Buie contends District can be liable under Restatement § 219(2)(d) because Best purported to act on behalf of MPD and used agency instrumentalities | District argues Best was outside the scope of employment, so respondeat superior does not apply | Denied as to District — plausible allegation that § 219(2)(d) applies because instrumentalities of office facilitated the assault |
| Whether plaintiff’s pleadings meet the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard | Allegations that Best was uniformed, armed, used a police vehicle and secured HQ access make a plausible claim of agency-facilitated tort | District did not meaningfully contest § 219(2)(d) applicability at reply | Court finds allegations sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) under § 219(2)(d) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403 F. Supp. 2d 39 (official-capacity claims duplicative of entity)
- Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560 (D.C. Ct. App. 1984) (sexual assault by teacher found outside scope of employment)
- Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (scope of employment can be fact question where misconduct relates to employment)
- Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752 (D.C. 2001) (employer may be liable where sexual misconduct is at least partly actuated by employer’s interests)
- Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (narrow reading of Restatement § 219(2)(d): liability where agent’s position facilitates tort via instrumentalities associated with agency)
- Doe v. Sipper, 821 F. Supp. 2d 384 (court denied dismissal on § 219(2)(d) theory where executive allegedly used position’s instrumentalities to commit rape)
- Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48 (Vt. 2004) (police officers’ extraordinary power can justify vicarious liability for sexual assaults)