180 Conn. App. 384
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- Plaintiffs (Bueno and den Dooven) own 1.38 acres originally part of a 30-acre Waterbury farm in Darien; their deed contains a 1941 committee deed restrictive covenant limiting use to one dwelling, setback requirements, and grantor approval of structures.
- The 30 acres were partitioned and sold in pieces: Vaughan received 1.544 acres in 1941 with the restriction; adjacent tracts later became the three‑lot Webb subdivision (lots 1–3) and the 31‑lot Briar Brae subdivision; most Briar Brae deeds do not contain the restriction.
- Webb subdivided land that had been conveyed subject to the restriction; houses were later constructed on Webb lots (including lot 3) and in Briar Brae, and the restriction was not enforced against nearly all lots for decades.
- Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that portions of the restriction (one‑dwelling limit, 25‑foot southern setback, and grantor approval requirement) are void and unenforceable so they may subdivide and sell part of their parcel.
- The trial court found the restriction unenforceable on grounds of permanent and substantial changed circumstances, abandonment (failure to enforce), and lack of benefit to any current property; defendants appealed.
- The appellate court affirmed: trial court findings were not clearly erroneous; it permissibly considered surrounding circumstances to construe ambiguous deed language; the restriction’s purpose was frustrated and thus unenforceable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the restrictive covenant is unenforceable due to substantial, permanent change of circumstances | The neighborhood transformed from farmland to a fully developed suburban area (Briar Brae and Webb subdivisions); near‑universal noncompliance shows the restriction’s purpose is frustrated | Enforcement remains appropriate; changes do not justify nullification | Court: covenant unenforceable — changes are drastic, permanent, and frustrate original purpose |
| Whether the trial court’s factual findings (lot 3 violation; homestead as beneficiary; dominant estate excludes Briar Brae) lack evidentiary support | Findings supported by chain of title, maps, and site inspection showing subdivision development and non‑enforcement | Findings are clearly erroneous and interrelated, prejudicing defendants | Appellate court: findings not clearly erroneous; even if some errors existed they were harmless to outcome |
| Whether the court improperly looked beyond the four corners of the deeds to interpret "effect, if any" language | Plaintiffs: deed language is ambiguous and must be read with surrounding circumstances to discern intent | Defendants: court should be confined to deed text only | Court: permissibly considered surrounding circumstances because deed references were ambiguous; plainer construction would not resolve applicability |
| Whether the restriction benefits whom (homestead vs. Briar Brae) and whether that choice affects application of change‑of‑circumstances tests | Plaintiffs: restriction was intended to protect the Waterbury homestead and, in any event, neither homestead nor Briar Brae benefits now | Defendants: restriction benefits Briar Brae and should remain enforceable; court focused improperly on surrounding area | Court: found homestead was intended beneficiary but held outcome same either way — purpose frustrated and restriction abandoned; unenforceable |
Key Cases Cited
- Shippan Point Assn., Inc. v. McManus, 34 Conn. App. 209 (Conn. App. 1994) (change‑of‑circumstances test: widespread violations and subdivision may defeat covenant’s purpose)
- Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 125 Conn. 373 (Conn. 1939) (stringent standard for modifying or nullifying restrictive covenants due to permanent changes)
- Marion Road Assn. v. Harlow, 1 Conn. App. 329 (Conn. App. 1984) (restrictive covenants for benefit of retained land construed against extending burden; intent assessed by surrounding circumstances)
- Grady v. Schmitz, 16 Conn. App. 292 (Conn. App. 1988) (courts reluctant to grant relief from covenants unless change is permanent and frustrates purpose; enforcement generally required absent inequity)
- Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109 (Conn. 1927) (principle on whether covenants run with the land and the role of notice/equity in enforcement)