Budrawich v. Budrawich, 200 Conn.App. 229

Background

Parties divorced in 2007; judgment provided alimony of $1/year until Nov. 28, 2022, "alimony shall be modifiable as to amount if the wife earns less than $100,000 per year" but not modifiable as to term.
Plaintiff filed a 2015 motion for order (reimbursement for children’s expenses); hearings occurred in 2016; posthearing memoranda filed in Oct. 2017.
With the Practice Book §11-19 120‑day decision deadline approaching, the court (via caseflow coordinator) emailed parties on Feb. 16, 2018 requesting a waiver/extension; defendant did not reply; status conference Feb. 22, 2018 was attended by plaintiff’s counsel only and the court proceeded on counsel’s agreement to extend the deadline.
Defendant timely filed a March 1, 2018 motion for reassignment under §11-19; a different judge (Wenzel, J.) denied reassignment, accepting that the prior judge had found defendant’s consent; Judge Sommer then issued an April 2, 2018 order awarding plaintiff $21,687 on the motion for order.
Separately, plaintiff’s April 20, 2017 motion to modify alimony was granted by the court (Nov. 9, 2017), ordering $700/week (retroactive); the court relied in part on findings about plaintiff’s medical expenses — including $291/week in uninsured medical expenses that plaintiff had withdrawn from her financial affidavit.
The Appellate Court reversed: it held the reassignment denial was erroneous (no evidence of waiver/consent) and reversed the alimony modification because the trial court’s finding about medical expenses was clearly erroneous; remanded for reassignment of the motion for order and a new hearing on alimony modification.

Issues

Issue	Budrawich (Plaintiff) Argument	Budrawich (Defendant) Argument	Held
1) Reassignment under Practice Book §11‑19 — did defendant waive the 120‑day deadline?	Plaintiff argued defendant effectively waived by not replying to caseflow e‑mails and missing the status conference, so reassignment was improper.	Defendant argued he did not consent; his silence and absence (he went to wrong courthouse) do not equal waiver and he timely filed for reassignment.	Reversed: no evidence of consent; silence/absence not waiver; timely motion required reassignment.
2) Modification of alimony — did plaintiff show a substantial change in circumstances?	Plaintiff argued job loss, reduced earning capacity, medical issues and increased out‑of‑pocket medical costs established a substantial change.	Defendant argued facts relied on by court were erroneous (notably medical expense figures) and court misapplied the decree.	Reversed: trial court’s substantial‑change finding rested in part on a clearly erroneous inclusion of withdrawn uninsured medical expenses; new hearing ordered.
3) Interpretation of dissolution alimony provision ("modif. as to amount if wife earns < $100,000") — does clause eliminate the substantial‑change requirement?	Plaintiff relied on the clause to support modification (court treated falling below $100,000 as predicate to modify).	Defendant argued clause only conditions modifiability (permits modification as to amount when wife earns < $100K) and does not relieve plaintiff of statutory burden to show substantial change.	Held: Clause does not eliminate the statutory substantial‑change requirement; it only addresses modifiability (amount vs term).
4) Defendant’s later motion to reduce alimony — is it ripe/moot?	N/A (motion sought downward modification).	Defendant sought downward modification after trial court granted plaintiff’s modification.	Moot: appellate reversal of plaintiff’s modification returned parties to original decree ($1/yr), making defendant’s post‑judgment modification claim moot.

Key Cases Cited

Reyes v. Bridgeport, 134 Conn. App. 422 (Conn. App. 2012) (judge must reassign an undecided short‑calendar matter after 120 days unless parties waived the deadline)
Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665 (Conn. 2013) (two‑step framework for alimony modification: first substantial change, then application of §46b‑82 factors)
Steller v. Steller, 181 Conn. App. 581 (Conn. App. 2018) (separation‑agreement language may permit a de novo "second look" absent a substantial‑change showing if text is clear)
Burke v. Burke, 94 Conn. App. 416 (Conn. App. 2006) (decree must contain clear, unambiguous language to preclude modification)
Sargent v. Sargent, 125 Conn. App. 824 (Conn. App. 2011) (reversal required where modification was premised on clearly erroneous factual findings about medical expenses)
Pryor v. Pryor, 162 Conn. App. 451 (Conn. App. 2016) (mootness doctrine and requirement that a successful appeal provide practical relief)