610 F.Supp.3d 1
D.D.C.2022Background
- After the January 6, 2021 attack, the House created the Select Committee to investigate causes and financing of the riot and to issue legislative recommendations.
- In November 2021 the Committee subpoenaed Taylor Budowich for documents and testimony and also subpoenaed his bank, J.P. Morgan Chase (JPMorgan), for his financial records relating to the Ellipse rally funding.
- Budowich produced documents and gave a deposition; JPMorgan, after notifying Budowich of the subpoena and his objection, produced responsive records to the Committee on December 24, 2021.
- Budowich and his company sued Speaker Pelosi, the Select Committee and its members, and JPMorgan seeking return of documents, damages, and declaratory/injunctive relief; the Congressional Defendants and JPMorgan moved to dismiss.
- The district court dismissed all claims: Speech or Debate Clause barred the claims against the Congressional Defendants; various grounds (mootness, lack of state action, statutory and state-law failures) defeated the claims against JPMorgan.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Speech or Debate Clause bars suit against Committee/members | Budowich: Committee acted unlawfully/was not duly authorized so Clause should not bar suit | Congressional Defs: Clause immunizes legislative acts including subpoenas; jurisdictional bar | Court: Clause applies; subpoena issuance and investigation are legislative acts; claims against Congressional Defs dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether claims against JPMorgan (constitutional and non-statutory federal counts) are justiciable or moot | Budowich: seeks relief and challenges ongoing Committee practice; exception for matters capable of repetition | JPMorgan: produced records already and will not produce more, so injunctive relief is impossible; counts are moot | Court: Counts I–III, V, VI moot because production completed and no relief against JPMorgan is possible |
| Whether JPMorgan’s compliance with subpoena constitutes state action for constitutional claims | Budowich: bank acted at government direction, so constitutional claims apply | JPMorgan: private actor complying with subpoena is not a state actor | Court: JPMorgan was not a state actor; constitutional claims fail on that basis (and would in any event be moot) |
| Whether RFPA, California privacy law, and UCL support claims against JPMorgan | Budowich: RFPA and California statutes/regulations limit disclosure; RFPA authorizes suit; state law gives privacy/UCL remedies | JPMorgan: RFPA does not cover Congress/committees; disclosure fits RFPA/GLBA/CalFIPA exceptions; California privacy and UCL claims fail as a matter of law | Court: RFPA does not apply to Congress; California privacy claim fails (not an egregious, highly offensive intrusion); UCL claims fail (no predicate unlawful act and unfairness not shown) |
Key Cases Cited
- Eastland v. U. S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (congressional investigatory subpoenas are legislative acts entitled to Speech or Debate protection)
- Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (definition of legislative acts and limits on judicial inquiry)
- Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (Speech or Debate protects legislative communications and integral legislative acts)
- Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (broad coverage of legislative acts under Speech or Debate)
- Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations v. Ferrer, 856 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (separation-of-powers bars courts from ordering return/destruction of subpoenaed documents)
- Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Select Committee has valid legislative purpose to investigate Jan. 6)
- Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020) (standards for evaluating congressional subpoenas and legislative purpose)
- Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (Bivens damages remedy not available against private entities)
- United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979) (waiver of Speech or Debate protection requires explicit, unequivocal renunciation)
