Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley County, 300 P.3d 18

Buckskin Properties, Buckskin, and Timberline entered into capital contribution and road development agreements to mitigate road impacts for The Meadows PUD (Phases 1–3; later phases contemplated) and paid/credited various mitigation costs and rights-of-way.
The CUP approved July 14, 2004 conditioned on Board approval of the Capital Contribution Agreement; the Board signed the CCA on July 26, 2004.
The Road Development Agreement for Phases 2–3 (Sept. 26, 2005) required Buckskin to mitigate per agreed costs; after credits Buckskin paid $232,160.
Phases 4–6 would impose higher per-lot fees; Buckskin never paid for Phases 4–6.
Buckskin filed Dec. 1, 2009 suit seeking declaratory relief that the RDAs were illegal development impact fees and inverse condemnation for Phases 2–3; district court granted summary judgment for the County; Buckskin appealed and the County cross-appealed on attorney fees.
Resolution 11-6 (Mar. 7, 2011) mooted Buckskin’s declaratory relief claim as to Phases 4–6 by offering IDIFA-compliant or alternative paths

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a governing board may lawfully enter voluntary infrastructure funding agreements	Buckskin—agreements impose unlawful development fees	County—agreements are voluntary, beneficial, and permissible	Yes; voluntary agreements lawful under IDIFA and LLUPA guidance
Whether Buckskin exhausted administrative remedies under LLUPA	Buckskin did not need LLUPA judicial review for these non-permit terms	Buckskin failed to seek judicial review of CUP/CCA conditions	Buckskin failed to exhaust administrative remedies; dismissal warranted
Whether Buckskin has a compensable inverse condemnation claim	Buckskin seeks recovery for Phase 2–3 payments	No taking; Buckskin benefited from improvements and voluntarily agreed	No compensable taking; inverse condemnation claim fails
Whether Resolution 11-6 moots Buckskin’s declaratory relief claim for Phases 4–6	Resolution does not moot because it is not legally binding	Resolution is binding guidance that moots the claim	Yes; declaratory relief moot under Resolution 11-6 Section 4
Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal	Prevailing party entitled to fees under I.C. § 12-117	Fees denied due to lack of frivolous conduct; no prevailing party on appeal	No attorney fees awarded on appeal; district court’s denial affirmed

KMST, LLC v. Cnty. of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (Idaho 2003) (development impact and regulatory taking contexts; voluntary agreements permitted under IDIFA)
Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 P.3d 900 (Idaho 2008) (exhaustion under LLUPA and judicial review relevance)
Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 156 P.3d 573 (Idaho 2007) (land use decisions; review and takings considerations)
Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (Idaho 1979) (limitations accrual in inverse condemnation context)
KMST (for KMST’s inverse condemnation discussion), 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (Idaho 2003) (voluntary agreements and takings analysis)
Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (Idaho 1954) (judicial estoppel doctrine relevance to later positions)
Regan v. Kootenai Cnty., 140 Idaho 721, 100 P.3d 615 (Idaho 2004) (exhaustion requirement and administrative remedies)
Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 156 P.3d 573 (Idaho 2007) (review of land use conditions and related claims)
Stafford v. Kootenai Cnty., 150 Idaho 841, 252 P.3d 1259 (Idaho 2011) (choice of governing statute for appellate review)
Potlatch Educ. Ass’n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (Idaho 2010) (attorney fees framework under I.C. § 12-117)
City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (Idaho 2012) (attorney fees and standard of abuse of discretion)