BUCKNER-WEBB v. State, 314 Ga. 823

Six Atlanta Public Schools employees (the Defendants) were convicted in a multi-defendant RICO conspiracy trial; each had separate trial counsel but one appellate attorney (Stephen Scarborough) was later appointed to represent all six on post-trial motions and appeal.
More than two years after his appointment, Scarborough sought to withdraw under Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7, asserting joint representation created materially adverse conflicts and that defendants would not waive the conflict.
The trial court held an in-chambers (ex parte) conference, then denied Scarborough’s motion to withdraw and issued a written order; it also issued a certificate of immediate review under OCGA § 5-6-34(b).
Defendants sought interlocutory review in the Court of Appeals and filed a direct appeal claiming the denial was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine; the Court of Appeals denied jurisdiction and dismissed the direct appeal.
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to decide whether orders denying motions to withdraw based on alleged conflicts are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine and affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an order denying counsel’s motion to withdraw for alleged conflicts is immediately appealable under Georgia’s collateral-order doctrine	Denial irreparably deprives defendants (and counsel) of right to conflict-free counsel; immediate appellate review required	Such orders are not in the “very small class” of collateral orders; parties can use statutory interlocutory procedures	Not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine; judgment affirmed
Whether counsel’s interest in avoiding ethical violations/discipline makes the order collateral and appealable	Counsel (Scarborough) argued his ethical duty and risk of Bar discipline make the issue effectively final and unreviewable on final judgment	State: alleged harms are speculative; other remedies exist; no categorical rule for immediate appeal	Counsel’s interest does not render the order “effectively final”; speculative discipline insufficient to justify collateral-order review
Whether alternative remedies make immediate collateral review unnecessary	Plaintiffs: alternatives are inadequate to protect rights now	Defendants/State: interlocutory certification under OCGA §5-6-34(b), contempt (and appeal of contempt), and other remedies provide review	Court held adequate alternative avenues exist (statutory interlocutory review, contempt route, after-term reconsideration); collateral order not warranted

Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171 (2019) (articulating Georgia’s collateral-order doctrine and the “very small class” test)
Buckner-Webb v. State, 360 Ga. App. 329 (2021) (Court of Appeals dismissed direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction applying collateral-order analysis)
Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. 639 (2020) (examined categorical analysis for collateral-order appealability—double jeopardy example)
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (federal exposition of collateral-order doctrine and focus on whether an entire category is adequately vindicated by other means)
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (origin of the collateral-order doctrine)
Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875 (1982) (Georgia’s adoption of collateral-order review for double jeopardy claims)
Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430 (1982) (applied the collateral-order doctrine in both civil and criminal contexts)
Johnson & Johnson v. Kaufman, 226 Ga. App. 77 (1997) (recognizing alternative remedies—including contempt and appeal from contempt—when direct appeal is unavailable)