Buck v. Davis
137 S. Ct. 759
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- Duane Buck was convicted of capital murder in Texas; the jury had to find unanimous and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt future dangerousness to impose death.
- Defense called court-appointed psychologist Dr. Walter Quijano, who concluded Buck was unlikely to be dangerous but stated in his report and testimony that race (Black) statistically increased probability of violence. The report — admitted into evidence — read: “Race. Black: Increased probability.”
- Prosecutor cross-examined Quijano about his race-based conclusion and relied on that testimony during summation; the jury reviewed the expert reports during deliberations and sentenced Buck to death.
- Buck did not raise the ineffective-assistance claim in his first state habeas; under then-governing Coleman rule his federal §2254 claim was procedurally defaulted. After Martinez and Trevino (which relaxed Coleman in certain cases), Buck sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief to reopen his federal habeas judgment.
- The District Court denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief (calling any mention of race "de minimis" and finding no Strickland prejudice); the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA). The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the COA denial by the Fifth Circuit improperly resolved merits at the COA stage | Buck: COA review should be limited to whether jurists of reason could debate the district court’s rulings; the Fifth Circuit improperly decided merits | State: Fifth Circuit properly concluded Buck’s case lacked extraordinary circumstances and was not debatable | Court: Fifth Circuit exceeded COA scope by effectively deciding merits; COA inquiry must be threshold/debatable only |
| Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by eliciting and admitting race-based expert evidence | Buck: Trial counsel performed deficiently by introducing expert testimony that race increased future dangerousness | State: Any racial mention was de minimis; moreover, defense (not prosecution) elicited it, so less prejudicial | Court: Counsel’s performance was deficient; no competent counsel would introduce race-as-violence evidence; Strickland first prong satisfied |
| Whether Buck suffered Strickland prejudice from the race-based testimony | Buck: The testimony appealed to racial stereotypes on the precise issue (future dangerousness); reasonable probability at least one juror would have reasonable doubt without it | State: Crime brutality and lack of remorse made death sentence likely regardless; testimony was minimal and elicited by defense | Court: Prejudice shown — race-linked expert evidence was powerful on the predictive question; not de minimis; reasonable probability of different outcome absent the testimony |
| Whether reopening the federal judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) was appropriate (extraordinary circumstances) | Buck: Extraordinary circumstances shown by race-based expert evidence, the State’s confession of error in similar cases, and Martinez/Trevino change in law permitting review | State: Change in law is not extraordinary; Buck’s case differs from those the State conceded; finality and Teague arguments bar relief | Court: District Court abused discretion; race-based sentencing taint and State’s actions in similar cases make circumstances extraordinary; Martinez/Trevino apply (State waived any Teague defense) |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (COA inquiry limited to whether issues are debatable)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (procedural-default rule)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (narrow exception to Coleman for ineffective-assistance claims in initial-review collateral proceedings)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (extends Martinez to states that effectively prevent raising IATC claims on direct review)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (Rule 60(b)(6) relief available only for extraordinary circumstances)
- Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (identifies constitutionally impermissible sentencing considerations)
- Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (equitable considerations relevant to reopening judgments)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (prejudice under Strickland requires substantial—not merely conceivable—likelihood of different result)
- Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (racial prejudice can infect capital sentencing)
- Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (expert psychiatric testimony can influence sentencing jury)
- Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (racial discrimination especially pernicious in administration of justice)