Bryce Markham v. Tony Wertin
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11586
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Bryce Markham, an apprentice in IBEW Local 545’s training program, alleged termination from assignments, reduced training opportunities, placement on probation, and removal from the program after a medical episode related to Crohn’s disease and use of a prescribed synthetic THC drug.
- Markham sued Local 545 under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) for failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation, and sued apprenticeship supervisor Tony Wertin for aiding and abetting those acts.
- Local 545 removed the case to federal court and invoked collective-bargaining documents (the CBA and apprenticeship standards) in support of dismissal; the district court held the state-law claims were completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and § 9(a) of the NLRA and dismissed as time-barred.
- On appeal, Markham argued the claims are state-law causes of action not completely preempted and thus the federal court lacked removal jurisdiction; he also sought to amend the petition (issue not reached by the appellate court due to remand).
- The Eighth Circuit analyzed whether Markham’s MHRA discrimination and retaliation claims—and his aiding-and-abetting claim against Wertin—were "substantially dependent" on interpretation of the CBA (LMRA preemption) or completely preempted by the NLRA duty-of-fair-representation.
- The court concluded the discrimination and retaliation claims (and the aiding-and-abetting claim) were not completely preempted, vacated dismissal, and directed remand to state court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 301(a) LMRA completely preempts Markham's MHRA discrimination and accommodation claims | Markham: his disability and accommodation requests are state-law rights independent of the CBA and can be resolved without interpreting CBA terms | Wertin/Local 545: resolving placement, probation, and reinstatement requires interpretation of CBA/standards (seniority, assignment procedures) so § 301 preempts | Not preempted: claims are independent; CBA may be consulted but is not substantially dependent for resolution |
| Whether § 301(a) LMRA completely preempts Markham's MHRA retaliation claim | Markham: retaliation claim depends on complaint and causal link, not CBA terms | Wertin: same CBA-based defenses implicate federal law | Not preempted: retaliation can be resolved without interpreting the CBA; analogous to worker's-comp retaliation precedents |
| Whether § 9(a) NLRA (duty of fair representation) completely preempts the state-law discrimination/retaliation claims | Markham: § 9(a) does not indicate Congress intended to occupy the field; state claims can proceed | Wertin: § 9(a) imposes the exclusive-duty framework that occupies the area and conflicts with state law | Not preempted: no clear congressional intent or conflict to convert state claims into federal ones; ordinary preemption defense remains available |
| Whether aiding-and-abetting claim against Wertin is completely preempted because it depends on the underlying MHRA claims | Markham: aiding-and-abetting is a state tort that survives even if plaintiff does not pursue claims against the union; underlying state-law violation is required but not preempted | Wertin: the claim necessarily implicates the CBA and federal duties | Not preempted: because underlying MHRA claims are not completely preempted, aiding-and-abetting remains a state-law claim; defensive federal questions insufficient for removal |
Key Cases Cited
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (federal-question/removal and well-pleaded complaint rule)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (complete preemption doctrine)
- Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (§ 301 empowers federal law for CBA enforcement)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (limits of § 301 preemption; state-law claims "inextricably intertwined")
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (distinguishing state causes of action independent of CBA)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (when state-law claim is independent of CBA)
- Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (duty of fair representation doctrine)
- Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33 (NLRA § 9(a) duty to represent members fairly)
- Trs. of Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324 (8th Cir.) (start with the claim to assess CBA dependence)
- Davis v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 21 F.3d 866 (8th Cir.) (contrast where reinstatement required interpretation of seniority under CBA)