Bryce J. Wallace and Elite Drillers Corporation, and Intervenor United Fire & Casualty Company and Its Parent, United Fire Group, Inc. v. Energen Resources Corporation, 603 S.W.3d 499

Energen owned leasehold and contracted Nabors to drill the Langley oil well; Energen separately contracted Dubose to drill a nearby water well and Dubose subcontracted Elite; Wallace (Elite employee) supervised completion of the water well.
From Jan. 14–17, 2014, the oil well experienced a gas kick, lost circulation, and continued operations with reported problems; contemporaneously Wallace and Elite were working on the water well ~500 feet away.
On Jan. 17 a sudden influx of gas erupted from the water well, causing an explosion and fire that severely burned Wallace and damaged Elite’s rig and equipment.
Wallace and Elite sued Energen alleging Energen’s negligent drilling of the oil well caused gas to enter the aquifer and the water well; United Fire intervened as subrogee.
Energen moved for traditional summary judgment arguing Chapter 95 applied (claims arose from condition/use of the water well or oil well improvement) and, alternatively, that it did not exercise/retain control; the trial court granted a take-nothing summary judgment.
On appeal the court considered (1) whether Energen conclusively proved Chapter 95 applies and (2) if so, whether claimants raised fact issues on the §95.003 control/knowledge exception; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Chapter 95 applies (i.e., did plaintiffs’ negligence "arise from the condition or use of the improvement on which they were working").	Wallace/Elite: Injuries were proximately caused by negligent activity on the oil well (a different improvement), so Chapter 95 does not apply.	Energen: Claims arise from a dangerous condition/use of the water well (the improvement where plaintiffs worked) or otherwise fall within Chapter 95.	Court: Energen failed to conclusively prove Chapter 95 applies; evidence raised a fact issue whether contemporaneous negligent activity on the oil well caused the injuries. Summary judgment reversed and remanded.
Whether plaintiffs raised a fact issue on the §95.003 control element (exception to owner immunity).	Wallace/Elite: Genuine issue exists that Energen exercised/retained control over their work.	Energen: It did not exercise/retain such control.	Court: Did not decide—unnecessary because factual dispute over Chapter 95 applicability precluded summary judgment.

Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. 2015) (interprets §95.002 applicability: ‘‘arises from’’ means causation; distinguishes "condition" vs "use").
Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. 2016) (Chapter 95 applies only when injury results from condition/use of the same improvement on which contractor was working).
Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992) (distinguishes negligent activity (contemporaneous malfeasance) from premises defect (condition created by prior activity)).
Sampson v. Univ. of Tex., 500 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. 2016) (courts must categorize claims as premises defect or negligent activity; prohibits re-casting claims to avoid statutory limits).
Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2016) (characterizes injury from release of hazardous system as premises defect where no contemporaneous activity caused injury).