Bryant v. Jefferson Mall Co.
486 S.W.3d 310
| Ky. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff Johnnie Bryant regularly participated in mall walking at Jefferson Mall during a free, public walking hour (9:00–10:00 a.m.) before stores opened.
- On January 11, 2012, during her fourth lap at ~9:50 a.m. on a rainy day, Bryant slipped on a puddle in an interior hallway and was injured.
- Bryant sued the Mall for negligent maintenance/ failure to warn; the Mall moved for summary judgment invoking Kentucky's recreational use statute, KRS 411.190.
- The Mall had knowingly allowed mall walking without charge for over a decade; Bryant was not shopping at the time and intended to shop only after walking.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the Mall; Bryant appealed arguing KRS 411.190 does not apply and that a factual dispute exists as to willful or malicious conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mall walking is a "recreational purpose" under KRS 411.190 | Mall walking is not the outdoor/exemplary activities listed and thus not covered | Mall walking is exercise comparable to listed activities (e.g., hiking) and falls within the statute's broad "includes, but is not limited to" language | Mall walking is a recreational purpose under KRS 411.190 |
| Whether the Mall's interior qualifies as "land" under KRS 411.190 | Mall interior is an enclosed commercial facility, not the open/undeveloped "land" contemplated by the statute | Statutory definition expressly includes buildings and structures attached to realty; commercial facilities are not excluded | Mall interior qualifies as "land" under the statute |
| Whether the Mall knew of and condoned the recreational use so as to trigger the statute | N/A (fact conceded: Mall knowingly permitted mall walking for years) | Mall's longstanding, free walking hour demonstrates knowledge and permission required to invoke KRS 411.190 | The Mall met the knowledge/permission requirement; KRS 411.190 is available as a defense |
| Whether a factual dispute exists under KRS 411.190(6) for "willful or malicious" failure to warn/guard | Bryant points to precedent finding jury question where owner acted with indifference (Huddleston) | No evidence here of prior puddles, prior notice, or indifference; Bryant herself walked the path multiple times without seeing the puddle | No genuine issue of material fact on willful or malicious conduct; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. Ct. App.) (summary judgment standard)
- Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991) (view record in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85 (Ky. 2003) (elements of prima facie negligence)
- Perry v. Williamson, 824 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1992) (duty analysis and visitor status)
- Coursey v. Westvaco Corp., 790 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1990) (knowledge/condonation required to invoke KRS 411.190)
- Collins v. Rocky Knob Associates, Inc., 911 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. Ct. App.) (KRS 411.190 applied to commercial enterprise)
- Huddleston v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App.) ("willful or malicious" exception can present jury question)