61 V.I. 416
Supreme Court of The Virgin Is...2014Background
- Bryan successfully challenged Alicia “Chucky” Hansen’s May 2014 nomination papers under 18 V.I.C. § 412; the V.I. Supreme Court (Aug 28, 2014) and Superior Court (Aug 29, 2014) ordered the Supervisor of Elections (Caroline Fawkes) to remove Hansen from the November ballot.
- After those orders, the Governor pardoned Hansen (Sept 3, 2014). Hansen submitted new nomination papers; Fawkes initially agreed to remove Hansen but then sought relief in federal court.
- Hansen and five voters obtained a temporary restraining order and then a permanent injunction from the U.S. District Court for the Virgin Islands directing Fawkes to place Hansen on the ballot; that proceeding was non‑adversarial and Fawkes largely joined Hansen’s position.
- Bryan moved in Superior Court to enforce the local orders and to hold Fawkes in contempt; the Superior Court denied relief (Oct 10, 2014), relying in part on the federal orders and treating 18 V.I.C. § 411(c) as providing a mandatory three‑day cure.
- The V.I. Supreme Court (this opinion) holds the District Court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction to issue orders based solely on territorial law and reaffirms that (a) local appellate authority is the final arbiter of V.I. law and (b) Hansen had no automatic right to cure under § 412 because she never sought discretionary leave to cure; it reverses the Superior Court, orders immediate removal of Hansen’s name, and remands for findings on possible contempt/sanctions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bryan) | Defendant's Argument (Fawkes/Hansen) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the U.S. District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin local orders and order Hansen placed on the ballot | District Court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction; the local in rem election proceedings were ongoing and federal court could not interfere | District Court had federal question / §1343 jurisdiction and could predict/apply V.I. law; its orders control | Court held District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders based solely on V.I. law; those federal orders are void and do not bar enforcement of local orders |
| Whether Hansen’s gubernatorial pardon retroactively validated her prior nomination papers or entitled her to an automatic cure | Pardon did not retroactively validate the nomination papers that had been judicially set aside; cure under §412 is discretionary and was never requested | Pardon restored civil rights and, together with §411(c), entitled Hansen to cure or reinstatement | Court agreed pardon did not retroactively validate papers; because Hansen never sought §412 discretionary relief, the Superior Court order stands; she may still run as write‑in and, if elected, be sworn in |
| Whether §411(c) three‑day cure applies after a court sets aside nomination papers under §412 | Bryan: §411(c) applies to supervisor rejections only; §412 controls judicial challenges and cure is discretionary | Fawkes/Hansen: §411(c) applies (automatic 3‑day cure) and therefore relief is automatic after pardon | Court held §411(c) applies to supervisor rejections; §412 governs judicial set‑asides and vests cure in the court’s discretion; no automatic cure applied here |
| Whether Fawkes should be held in contempt or sanctioned for noncompliance | Bryan: Fawkes disregarded valid V.I. Supreme Court and Superior Court orders and colluded in non‑adversarial federal proceedings to evade enforcement; sanctions appropriate | Fawkes: she complied with federal court orders and acted reasonably given conflicting directives | Court vacated denial of sanctions and remanded for factual findings and conclusions on collusion/contempt; did not itself impose sanctions |
Key Cases Cited
- Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877) (pardon does not retroactively erase prior legal consequences)
- Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939) (priority rule: the court first assuming jurisdiction over res may exclude others)
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to act as appellate tribunals over state court judgments)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (Rooker‑Feldman principles extend to review of certain local court decisions)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (Rooker‑Feldman limited to cases where federal plaintiff seeks review of state‑court judgment)
- Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (appellate court may revisit jurisdictional conclusions of another federal court)
- Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) (full faith and credit presumption when jurisdictional questions were fully and fairly litigated)
- Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (caution against federal court changes to election procedures close to an election)
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (fundamental right to vote and principles on vote dilution)