Bryan Morton v. State of Mississippi
246 So. 3d 895
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- On May 4, 2014, Charlie Arnold was violently attacked in her home; a woman (Kimberly Chapman) and a man were involved, Arnold sustained severe head wounds and items were taken. Chapman was found later with Arnold’s identification and other items in her car.
- Chapman gave a statement implicating Bryan Morton; phone and call-record evidence linked Chapman and Morton that night. Physical evidence (a jacket, broken gun stock, and walking cane) contained DNA consistent with Arnold and male DNA that could not exclude Morton or his patrilineal relatives.
- At trial Chapman testified against Morton, describing Morton’s participation; Morton testified and offered alibi witnesses who said he remained at another house. Other witnesses gave statements damaging to Morton’s alibi.
- A jury convicted Morton of attempted murder, armed robbery, and burglary of a dwelling; sentences totaled consecutive thirty-year terms for attempted murder and armed robbery (burglary concurrent). Morton appealed.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed claims including indictment sufficiency, jury-instruction variances, ineffective assistance of counsel (alibi instruction and failure to seek Franks hearing), and several trial-evidence objections raised in a pro se supplemental brief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indictment sufficiency for attempted murder | Morton: indictment failed to allege whether he "failed" or was "prevented" from completing murder, omitting an essential element | State: indictment used the word "attempt" and language that the act, if accomplished, would be murder, giving fair notice | Affirmed: indictment legally sufficient; failure to explicitly recite the third element of attempt is not fatal when indictment fairly notifies defendant |
| Jury instructions — attempted murder & constructive amendment | Morton: S-1B omitted phrase from indictment and thus omitted an essential element or materially varied the charge | State: instructions tracked requisite attempt elements (intent, direct ineffectual act, failure to consummate); variance did not alter elements | Affirmed: instructions adequate; no constructive amendment or prejudice |
| Jury instructions — armed robbery (taking vs attempt) | Morton: instructions charged an "attempt to take," differing from indictment alleging an actual taking, constituting constructive amendment | State: statute criminalizes both taking and attempt to take; variance immaterial | Affirmed: no prejudice; both attempt and completed taking fall within armed-robbery statute |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to request alibi instruction | Morton: counsel erred by not requesting alibi instruction, prejudicing defense | State: record does not affirmatively show counsel was constitutionally ineffective; strategy choices presumed reasonable; jury could consider alibi testimony under general presumption of innocence instruction | Denied on direct appeal; claim not resolved on merits and preserved for PCR since record insufficient to show clear deficiency |
| Supplemental trial-evidence complaints (prior bad acts, opinion testimony, bolstering) | Morton: prosecution elicited inadmissible prior-bad-acts and opinion/bolstering testimony that prejudiced jury | State: challenged testimony was either stricken, objected to on different grounds, or not objected to at trial | Affirmed: prior-bad-acts remark was stricken and objection was hearsay (not preserved on the specific ground); opinion and bolstering complaints were procedurally barred for failure to contemporaneously object |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to seek Franks hearing on search warrant | Morton: counsel should have moved to suppress search-warrant evidence via Franks; affidavit contained untrustworthy statements | State: Morton’s allegations were conclusory; record does not affirmatively show deficient performance | Denied on direct appeal and preserved for PCR; claims were conclusory and insufficient for Franks relief on record |
Key Cases Cited
- Colburn v. State, 201 So. 3d 462 (Miss. 2016) (standard of review for indictment defects and de novo review)
- Sanderson v. State, 883 So. 2d 558 (Miss. 2004) (indictment legally sufficient if fair reading describes nature and cause of charge)
- Spearman v. State, 58 So. 3d 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (failure to charge the third element of attempt does not render indictment defective)
- Neal v. State, 936 So. 2d 463 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (instructions need not mirror indictment wording if they accurately state the elements)
- Graham v. State, 185 So. 3d 992 (Miss. 2016) (constructive amendment occurs when jury may convict on a factual basis that effectively modifies an essential element)
- Houston v. State, 811 So. 2d 371 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (both attempt to take and actual taking can constitute robbery under armed-robbery statute)
- Reed v. State, 204 So. 3d 785 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (direct-appeal ineffective-assistance claims may be addressed only when record affirmatively shows constitutional ineffectiveness)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (U.S. 1978) (standard for challenging veracity of statements in a search-warrant affidavit)