946 F. Supp. 2d 392
E.D. Pa.2013Background
- Judge Mark A. Bruno, a Pennsylvania magisterial district judge, was indicted in Jan. 2013 for conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud.
- On Feb. 1, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suspended Bruno without pay, pending further order, without prior notice.
- Bruno continued to receive medical benefits but paid $72 monthly for them; he claimed the suspension violated procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Bruno filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the suspension pending his criminal trial; PA Supreme Court Defendants moved to deny.
- The court exercised federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and addressed Rooker-Feldman and the merits of due process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Rooker-Feldmanbar Brunos claims? | Rooker-Feldman deprives federal review of final state judgments. | Rooker-Feldman bars claims arising from state-court judgments; suspension may be final. | Rooker-Feldman does not apply; state proceedings not ended and suspension not final. |
| Whether Bruno has a protected property interest in his judicial position for due process purposes | Bruno has a due process property interest in his judicial office. | No protected property interest; but due process analyzed regardless. | Bruno need not prove a property interest to prevail on the specific due process claim at this stage. |
| Whether pre-suspension hearing was required under due process | Bruno was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing. | Gilbert v. Homar permits no pre-suspension hearing when indictment exists; post-suspension process suffices. | No pre-suspension hearing required; indictment provides sufficient assurance for suspension without pay. |
| Whether Bruno is entitled to a post-suspension hearing | If not afforded a post-suspension hearing, due process was violated. | Suspension Order invites relief or a post-suspension hearing; he has not sought it in PA Supreme Court. | Bruno has not shown likelihood of success because he has not pursued post-suspension relief offered by the Court. |
| Whether Bruno's likelihood of success on the merits supports a preliminary injunction | Procedural due process violation warrants relief. | Sufficient process exists; likelihood of success is lacking at this stage. | Motion for preliminary injunction denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (U.S. 1997) (factors for due-process pre-suspension interest; pre-suspension hearing not always required)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (Rooker-Feldman applicability and limits)
- Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (U.S. 2006) (Rooker-Feldman; final state-court judgments)
- Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993) (administering state courts; adjudicative vs ministerial acts; Rooker-Feldman applicability)
- In re Avellino, 690 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 1997) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court supervisory powers to discipline judges)
- In re McFalls, 795 A.2d 367 (Pa. 2002) (Pennsylvania supervisory powers over courts)
- Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (test for when state proceedings have ended for Rooker-Feldman purposes)