639 F. App'x 683
2d Cir.2016Background
- Petitioner James Bruno was convicted in New York; he filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence taken from a motel room where he had been staying.
- The motel was operated by a community agency (BROC) that housed homeless families; Bruno was alleged to be behind on rent, the manager (Donna Stearns) padlocked the room and inventoried contents pursuant to motel policy, and an investigator documented the inventory.
- Bruno argued the inventory/search violated the Fourth Amendment and that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress that evidence.
- The state trial court rejected Bruno’s ineffectiveness claim on the merits; the New York Appellate Division later held the claim procedurally barred as one that could have been raised on direct appeal.
- The district court denied the habeas petition (finding procedural default in the alternative). This Court granted a certificate of appealability on whether counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress.
- The Second Circuit assumed (without deciding) the claim was not procedurally defaulted but held on the merits that counsel was not ineffective because a suppression motion would have failed: officers reasonably relied on the manager’s apparent authority to inventory the unit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claim is procedurally defaulted | Bruno contends his IAC claim was properly raised in a CPL 440.10 collateral proceeding (a mixed record/non-record claim) | State says claim was forfeited because it could have been raised on direct appeal | Court assumed claim was not defaulted but did not decide; proceeded to resolve it on the merits |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress motel-search evidence | Bruno: counsel’s failure was objectively unreasonable and prejudiced him because suppression would have succeeded | Respondent: suppression motion would have failed because manager had apparent authority and officers reasonably relied on her representations | Held: No Strickland prejudice — suppression motion would not have succeeded; counsel not ineffective |
| Whether officers’ reliance on manager’s consent/search was reasonable | Bruno: he had privacy interest and manager lacked authority; search unconstitutional | State: manager as property manager could consent to inventory of an unoccupied room; officers reasonably relied on her | Held: Apparent authority and reasonable reliance validated the inventory/search; any mistake was reasonable |
| Whether a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue was required for an IAC claim | Bruno: N/A (implicit that suppression meritorious) | Respondent: under Kimmelman, petitioner must show meritorious Fourth Amendment claim to prove Strickland prejudice | Held: No meritorious Fourth Amendment claim shown, so IAC fails under Kimmelman/Strickland |
Key Cases Cited
- Parker v. Ercole, 666 F.3d 830 (2d Cir. 2012) (standard of review for habeas denial)
- Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (U.S. 1989) (procedural-default doctrine)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (adequate and independent state ground doctrine)
- Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1991) (state rule must be firmly established and regularly followed to be adequate)
- Bierenbaum v. Graham, 607 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010) (adequacy/independence analysis in habeas review)
- Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2003) (state procedural rule adequacy applied to specific circumstances)
- Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 1999) (comity and careful analysis before finding a state rule inadequate)
- Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (U.S. 1986) (to show IAC based on failure to litigate Fourth Amendment claim, petitioner must show a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue)
- United States v. Matos, 905 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1990) (relationship between meritorious Fourth Amendment claim and Strickland prejudice)
- United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 1995) (apparent authority and reasonable official reliance can validate a search)
- Sweet v. Bennett, 353 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (limitations on collateral attack where petitioner previously raised some IAC claims on direct appeal)