Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269

Background

Kevan Brumfield was convicted in Louisiana of first-degree murder (1993) and sentenced to death; he later raised an Atkins claim that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution.
At sentencing mitigation, defense evidence included: an IQ test score reported as 75, a fourth‑grade reading level, placement in special education, childhood psychiatric hospitalizations and psychotropic medications, low birth weight, and experts who described learning deficits and borderline intelligence.
After Atkins v. Virginia, Louisiana law (State v. Williams) required an evidentiary hearing when objective factors raised a "reasonable ground" to believe a defendant is intellectually disabled; Williams applied a three‑part test: (1) subaverage intelligence (IQ), (2) significant adaptive-skill impairment, (3) onset during the developmental stage.
The state trial court denied an Atkins evidentiary hearing and denied funding to develop the claim, finding Brumfield’s IQ inconsistent with intellectual disability and no evidence of adaptive impairment; the Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.
On federal habeas, the District Court granted relief (found both §2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) satisfied and later concluded Brumfield is intellectually disabled). The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding AEDPA barred relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court held that the state trial court’s factual determinations were unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2) and vacated and remanded so Brumfield could have his Atkins claim considered on the merits in federal court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Brumfield)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the state court’s denial of an Atkins evidentiary hearing was based on an unreasonable determination of facts under §2254(d)(2)	Record evidence (IQ 75 within SEM range, adaptive deficits, special ed, childhood hospitalization/medication, low birth weight) created reasonable doubt and entitled him to a hearing	State argued trial record showed IQ inconsistent with disability and no adaptive impairment; AEDPA requires deference	Court: Yes. The state court’s factual findings (that IQ 75 precluded disability and that record showed no adaptive impairment) were unreasonable under §2254(d)(2) and federal review of the claim on the merits is warranted
Whether §2254(d)(1) was satisfied because the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law (e.g., by denying funding to develop Atkins claim)	Denial of funds and hearing in effect prevented development of threshold showing; thus unreasonable application of federal law	State contended no clearly established Supreme Court precedent required funding for Atkins threshold showing; issue was not pressed below	Court: Did not decide §2254(d)(1) because §2254(d)(2) sufficed; declined to reach §2254(e)(1) applicability because State waived below
Whether IQ score of 75 (reported by expert) categorically precludes intellectual disability once SEM is considered	Brumfield: IQ 75 falls within range (70–75) when accounting for SEM; authoritative sources treat 75 as consistent with possible diagnosis	State: Trial testimony treated 75 as excluding significant subaverage functioning; suggested other tests showed higher IQ	Court: IQ 75, given SEM and sources relied on by Williams and Atkins, is consistent with possibility of intellectual disability; state court’s contrary factual determination unreasonable
Whether record showed insufficient evidence of adaptive functioning deficits to justify a hearing	Brumfield: Special education placement, learning disability diagnoses, fourth-grade reading, childhood hospitalizations/meds, low birth weight raise questions about adaptive deficits	State: Countervailing evidence (expert findings of adequate problem‑solving, independent living, antisocial personality explaining behavior) defeats threshold showing	Court: Evidence before state court was sufficient to raise reasonable doubt about adaptive impairment; contrary findings were unreasonable under §2254(d)(2)

Key Cases Cited

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding execution of intellectually disabled persons violates Eighth Amendment and leaving states to develop procedures)
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (SEM must be considered; states may not categorically bar consideration when IQ is above 70 but within measurement error)
State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835 (La. 2002) (Louisiana adopted three‑part test for mental retardation and required a hearing when objective factors raise a reasonable ground)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas courts limited to state‑court record under AEDPA but may hold evidentiary hearings when §2254(d) does not bar relief)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (deference does not preclude habeas relief where state factual findings are unreasonable)
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 (2010) (federal habeas cannot grant relief merely because it would reach a different conclusion)
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006) (reasonableness standard for factual determinations on habeas)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (due‑process principles require a hearing when prisoner makes substantial threshold showing of incompetency to be executed)
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (indigent defendant's right to access to psychiatric assistance in certain circumstances; Court distinguished Ake from Atkins funding claim)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (deference to state-court decisions; unreasonableness standard under §2254(d)(1))
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (state-law errors are not independently cognizable on federal habeas)