Bruce Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, Florida
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14957
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Bruce Wright, a minister and outreach advocate for the homeless, was arrested in Williams Park, St. Petersburg, for resisting arrest/obstruction after refusing police orders and was issued a one-year trespass warning under St. Petersburg Ord. § 20-30.
- The trespass warning barred Wright from re-entering the park for one year but allowed use of sidewalks and other city parks; § 20-30(g) permits suspensions of a ban to allow First Amendment activity if no reasonable alternative exists.
- Wright appealed the warning administratively and in state court; a hearing master and a three-judge circuit panel upheld the warning; the City later granted a one-day suspension so Wright could attend a rally.
- Wright sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming § 20-30 (facially and as-applied) and § 20-30(g) (as prior restraint and vague) violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; the district court granted summary judgment for the City.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, holding the trespass warning punished nonexpressive unlawful conduct and only incidentally burdened speech; § 20-30(g) was not an unconstitutional prior restraint and no pattern of discriminatory enforcement was shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial validity of § 20-30 under the First Amendment | § 20-30 bans access to a public forum and is therefore facially unconstitutional | Ordinance targets unlawful conduct, not speech; Catron forecloses overbreadth challenge | Rejected — facial challenge fails (Catron controls; not unconstitutional in all applications) |
| As-applied challenge: exclusion from park burdened First Amendment activity | Wright's exclusion from Williams Park impermissibly restricted his ability to speak and minister in a traditional public forum | Trespass warning punished nonexpressive unlawful conduct; any burden on speech was incidental and mitigated by alternatives and suspension procedure | Rejected — Arcara framework applies; ordinance targets nonexpressive conduct and did not inevitably single him out |
| § 20-30(g) as a prior restraint | Granting officials discretion to suspend bans is a censorial prior restraint susceptible to abuse | § 20-30(g) is not a permit scheme for lawful forum access but a mechanism to allow more speech by suspending a ban; it is not censorial | Rejected — not a prior restraint because it permits access rather than preemptively restricting speech; no evidence of discriminatory practice |
| Vagueness challenge to § 20-30(g) under Due Process | The discretion in § 20-30(g) is vague and allows arbitrary denial of suspension | § 20-30(g) authorizes re-entry (not punishment) and contains the ‘‘shall not be unreasonably denied’’ restraint; no conviction or sanction element creating vagueness problem | Rejected — § 20-30(g) does not impose punishment and vagueness challenge fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (protects political/religious speech at public fora)
- Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (time, place, manner analysis in public fora)
- Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (sanctions for nonexpressive unlawful conduct that incidentally burden speech do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (regulations excluding access to public spaces can trigger strict forum scrutiny when they categorically exclude speakers)
- Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (licensing regimes requiring standards to avoid prior restraint)
- Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (permit requirements as prior restraints)
- Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (public forum doctrine; content-neutral TPM restrictions standard)
- Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260 (Eleventh Circuit precedent rejecting overbreadth challenge to § 20-30)