Bruce Vosburgh v. FCA US LLC
2:16-md-02744
E.D. Mich.Mar 29, 2022Background
- MDL against FCA alleging monostable (shift-by-wire) gearshifter is defective because it impairs reliable gear selection and lacks sufficient tactile/audible feedback.
- Court previously limited expert testimony at class-certification stage but certified a common-issues class for trial on design defect, concealment, and materiality.
- Plaintiffs moved to exclude defendant experts: economist Bruce Strombom (damages/consumer valuation) and engineer Robert Kuhn (engineering / human-factors topics).
- Strombom submitted a supplemental report disclaiming any opinion on whether a defect exists and relying on wholesale used-car auction data to conclude no excess depreciation and no diminished consumer value.
- Kuhn is a veteran automotive engineer (not a human-factors specialist) who opined on availability of alternative shifter designs, safety of FCA’s design, recall effectiveness, and commonality of components.
- Court excluded Strombom entirely; it excluded most of Kuhn’s opinions but allowed a narrow set of factual and regulatory opinions enumerated in the order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Strombom’s valuation/depreciation opinions (materiality/damages) | Strombom used wholesale auction data (dealer purchasers), not consumer choice data; no reliable method to translate to retail willingness-to-pay or point-of-sale damages. | His analysis shows no excess depreciation of class vehicles, so consumers did not value them less because of the alleged defect. | Excluded — unreliable analytical leap from wholesale auction prices to consumer valuation; Court previously rejected similar methodology. |
| Kuhn: availability of alternative shifter designs (Jaguar rotary, polystable lever) | Kuhn’s statements repeat defendant positions and rely on a single ambiguous slide; unsupported factual conclusions. | Based on engineering documents and industry knowledge, alternatives were limited or unavailable for some platforms. | Partly allowed: Kuhn may testify that no polystable lever-style design existed pre-2012; excluded his conclusory opinion that the Jaguar rotary was not commercially available (fact for jury). |
| Kuhn: safety of design and reasonableness of FCA’s engineering decisions | Kuhn lacks human-factors expertise, didn’t review the defendant’s human-factors studies, and cherry-picked record material to conclude no safety issues. | Kuhn relied on documents, experience, and testing records to conclude design was consistent with industry practice and met standards. | Mostly excluded: opinion that design was safe/reasonable is unsupported and invades jury’s factfinding; limited regulatory-compliance statement allowed (meets FMVSS). |
| Kuhn: commonality of design and prevalence of similar defects (safety record) | Opinions lack factual basis (based on photographs/part numbers) and insufficient evidence to show many manufacturers had similar problems. | Relied on public records, recall data, and experience. | Excluded as to commonality and broad prevalence claims; Court allowed narrow factual opinions (see order): e.g., <1% complaint calculation, SBW required for 8-speed, parking-brake regulatory point, S27 recall purpose and installation on named plaintiffs’ cars. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (standard for admissibility of expert testimony — relevance and reliability).
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to non-scientific expert testimony).
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (expert excluded where analytical gap between data and opinion is too great).
- United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016) (expert testimony may assist jurors beyond common knowledge).
- Mitchell v. City of Warren, 803 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2015) (caution against speculative leaps in expert causation opinions).
- Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2010) (ipse dixit insufficient; speculation not scientific knowledge).
- Lee v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 760 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2014) (expert theory must fit the facts of the case).
- Kalamazoo River Study Grp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 171 F.3d 1065 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting jury speculation based on expert testimony).
- Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 1999) (expert testimony inadmissible when facts relied on contradict physical evidence).