Bruce Vosburgh v. FCA US LLC, 2:16-md-02744

Multidistrict litigation (MDL No. 2744) consolidated claims over FCA US LLC vehicles (2012–2015 Chrysler 300, Dodge Charger, Jeep Grand Cherokee) equipped with a monostable electronic gearshift that returns to center and uses only indicator lights for gear position.
Plaintiffs allege the shifter can fail to engage or remain in Park, or can move out of Park, producing rollaway incidents; NHTSA logged hundreds of complaints and opened an investigation.
Plaintiffs in the FACMC seek only economic damages (overpayment, repair-related time costs, accelerated depreciation, diminished functionality) and equitable relief; personal-injury claims are in a separate complaint.
FCA issued a voluntary recall and later offered a software "auto-park" retrofit; plaintiffs allege the fix was ineffective for a substantial number of vehicles and that negative publicity (including a high-profile death) depressed resale values.
FCA moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing the FACMC fails to allege Article III injury-in-fact and that injunctive relief claims are preempted by the Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA)/NHTSA recall process.
The court heard the motion and denied dismissal, finding the FACMC adequately alleges concrete, particularized injuries and that preemption does not strip the court of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing — injury in fact	Plaintiffs purchased defective vehicles, overpaid for safety they did not get, incurred time costs for failed repairs, and suffered diminished resale value.	FCA: plaintiffs allege only absence of an unbargained-for feature; alleged harms are speculative/attenuated and insufficiently concrete.	Court: FACMC pleads concrete, particularized economic injuries (overpayment, repair costs/time, depreciation); standing satisfied.
Injunctive relief / MVSA preemption	Plaintiffs seek equitable relief (e.g., buyback, repair) to remedy the defect; recall process does not foreclose private remedies.	FCA: NHTSA has exclusive authority over recalls; court intervention would conflict with federal scheme and is preempted.	Court: Preemption is a merits question, not a jurisdictional defect; MVSA saving clause and precedent permit common-law remedies; jurisdiction not defeated.

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing elements)
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (speculative chain of possibilities insufficient for imminence)
In re Toyota Motor Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (economic loss from defective vehicle confers standing)
In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prod. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013) (injury at point of sale from failure-to-warn theory)
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004) (preemption generally addresses merits, not jurisdiction)
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (MVSA preemption and saving clause interplay)