527 F.Supp.3d 67
D. Mass.2021Background
- Plaintiff Christopher Bruce, a longtime WRTA bus driver employed by contractor CMTM, was terminated after permitting a Telemundo crew to interview him while he was on duty, in uniform, and driving around the WRTA Hub.
- CMTM operates WRTA service under contract and enforces its own discipline policies; drivers are subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement and an Employee Discipline Policy that classifies certain misconduct as Class II infractions.
- Bruce had an extensive disciplinary history and had signed a two-year Last Chance Return to Work Agreement (LC Agreement) in which he and the union agreed that any further Class I/II violation would result in immediate termination and waived grievance/arbitration rights for two years.
- CMTM charged Bruce with three Class II infractions (safety violation/failure to follow work orders; unauthorized media statements; willful disregard of safety practices); he admitted the conduct and was terminated.
- Bruce sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) for retaliation/First Amendment violation and pleaded a state-law tortious interference claim against individual supervisors; the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The court denied summary judgment on the enforceability of the LC Agreement waiver (genuine factual dispute whether waiver was knowing/voluntary) but granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims, finding Bruce spoke as an employee (not a citizen) and, in any event, was terminated for unprotected safety/work-rule violations; the tortious-interference claim failed for lack of evidence of malice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of LC Agreement waiver | Bruce: waiver clause is general and did not knowingly/voluntarily waive statutory/constitutional claims | CMTM: Bruce knowingly waived rights; agreement negotiated with union counsel and supported by consideration | Court: Genuine issue of material fact exists whether waiver encompassed constitutional/statutory rights; summary judgment on waiver denied (but not dispositive) |
| Whether Bruce's interview was protected speech | Bruce: spoke on matter of public concern (funding cuts) as a citizen | Defendants: interview was on-duty, in uniform, on employer property, and derived from his job—speech as employee, not citizen | Court: Bruce spoke as an employee, not a citizen; no First Amendment protection for this conduct |
| Whether termination violated First Amendment / MCRA | Bruce: termination was retaliation for public‑concern speech | Defendants: terminated for admitted Class II safety/work-order/media violations; even if protected, employer would have disciplined regardless | Court: Summary judgment for defendants — Bruce was terminated for unprotected safety/work-rule violations; MCRA claim likewise fails (no threats/coercion and no protected speech) |
| Tortious interference by individual supervisors | Bruce: supervisors caused wrongful termination | Trabucco/Parker: no actual malice or wrongful means; no evidence presented | Court: Summary judgment for Trabucco and Parker — plaintiff failed to show actual malice and did not oppose the defense arguments |
Key Cases Cited
- Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231 (1st Cir.) (summary judgment standard)
- Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC, 575 F.3d 145 (1st Cir.) (genuine issue/material fact definition at summary judgment)
- Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.) (summary judgment burdens)
- Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.) (cross-motions for summary judgment standard)
- Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.) (enforceability of waivers of constitutional claims)
- Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272 (1st Cir.) (totality-of-circumstances test for knowing/voluntary waiver)
- Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91 (1st Cir.) (public-employee speech framework)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (Supreme Court) (public-employee speech scope)
- City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (Supreme Court) (limits on public-employee speech protections)
- Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22 (1st Cir.) (employee‑vs‑citizen and balancing test)
- Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713 (Mass.) (MCRA requires threats, intimidation or coercion)
- Amirault v. City of Malden, 241 F. Supp. 3d 288 (D. Mass.) (factors for employee/citizen speech)
- Foley v. Randolph, 601 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D. Mass.) (determinations of protected speech as question of law)