Bruce Millar v. Construction Code Authority, 912 N.W.2d 521

Bruce Millar was an inspector for the Construction Code Authority (CCA), which contracted with Imlay City and Elba Township to provide inspections.
On March 11 and March 20, 2014, Imlay City and Elba Township sent letters to the CCA directing termination of Millar’s inspection services in their jurisdictions.
On March 27, 2014, the CCA drafted a letter to Millar notifying him he would no longer inspect in those communities, but took no action to implement that decision until March 31, 2014, when Millar was handed the letter and prevented from working in Imlay City.
Millar filed suit June 26, 2014, alleging violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and conspiracy; the trial court granted summary disposition to defendants as time-barred, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Michigan Supreme Court granted review limited to whether Millar’s WPA claim was barred by the 90-day limitations period in MCL 15.363(1).
The Supreme Court held the limitations period began when the employer took the adverse employment action (March 31), not when the earlier decisions or letters were made, so Millar’s WPA claim was timely; it reversed in part, vacated the summary disposition, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the 90‑day limitations period in MCL 15.363(1) begin to run for a WPA claim?	Millar: It begins when the employer implements the adverse action (when he was prevented from working on March 31).	Defendants: It began when they decided/communicated to CCA to terminate him (March 11/20) or when CCA drafted the March 27 letter.	The court held the clock starts when the employer takes an adverse employment action to implement the decision (March 31).
Whether the writing of termination letters alone constitutes an "occurrence" triggering accrual.	Millar: Letters alone do not trigger accrual absent implementation.	Defendants: The letters were the actionable occurrences that started the 90‑day period.	The court rejected that view: a decision alone is not enough—an actionable wrong requires implementation.
Whether Collins or Joliet governs accrual analysis for WPA claims.	Millar: Collins (accrual on actual termination/adverse action) controls.	Defendants: Joliet/Magee (accrual on last discriminatory act) support earlier accrual.	The court applied Collins, distinguishing Joliet and Magee because those involved no discriminatory discharge and different facts.
Timeliness of Millar's WPA claim given the 90‑day limit.	Millar: Filed within 90 days of March 31, so timely.	Defendants: Filed after 90 days from earlier letter dates, so untimely.	Held timely: complaint filed 87 days after March 31; dismissal reversed and case remanded.

Collins v. Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628 (2003) (limitations period for discriminatory discharge begins on actual discharge)
Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich 108 (2005) (limitations began on last date of alleged discriminatory treatment where no discharge claim asserted)
Joliet v. Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30 (2006) (accrual on last discriminatory act; distinguished from discharge cases)
Debano‑Griffin v. Lake Co., 493 Mich 167 (2013) (WPA prima facie elements include protected activity and adverse employment action)