Bruce Goldfarb v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
791 F.3d 500
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- Goldfarb (and co-plaintiffs) sued the City of Baltimore, CBAC Gaming (and subsidiary), and former owner Maryland Chemical under RCRA, alleging hazardous contamination at a former-industrial Casino Site had migrated to adjacent Waterfront Parcels and the Middle Branch.
- The City transferred parts of the Casino Site to CBAC Borrower; CBAC Gaming is the casino operator and led construction/remediation under a Voluntary Cleanup Program and a Maryland NPDES construction-stormwater permit incorporating erosion, sediment control, stormwater management plans, and a Response Action Plan (RAP).
- Plaintiffs allege defendants (1) operated an unpermitted hazardous-waste facility, (2) excavated/mixed/relocated contaminated soils and leaking drums, and (3) thereby contributed to ongoing contamination and migration — asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (permitting violations) and (B) (imminent and substantial endangerment).
- The district court dismissed all RCRA claims (invoking RCRA’s anti-duplication provision re: CWA/NPDES for CBAC Gaming and finding pleading deficiencies for City and Maryland Chemical). Plaintiffs appealed; the Fourth Circuit reviews de novo.
- The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded: it held the anti-duplication provision (§ 6905(a)) is not jurisdictional and cannot justify dismissal at the 12(b)(1) stage; and the district court erred in dismissing the § 6972(a)(1)(A) and (B) claims as inadequately pled for the City and Maryland Chemical and erred in applying § 6905(a) without showing true inconsistency between RCRA and CWA requirements for CBAC Gaming.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 6905(a) (RCRA anti-duplication vis-à-vis CWA/NPDES) is jurisdictional and bars RCRA suit | § 6905(a) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it is an affirmative defense | § 6905(a) precludes RCRA claims where CWA permits (NPDES) already govern the activity | § 6905(a) is not jurisdictional; it is an affirmative defense about the viability of the cause of action; dismissal under 12(b)(1) was improper |
| Whether district court properly dismissed CBAC Gaming under Rule 12(b)(6) based on NPDES/RAP materials | Relying on NPDES/RAP, CBAC says further RCRA obligations would be "inconsistent" with CWA-based permit obligations | Plaintiffs say: factual disputes and different obligations mean RCRA may still apply; judicial notice and reliance on extrinsic documents was inappropriate at 12(b)(6) | Court vacated dismissal — § 6905(a) requires an actual inconsistency (incompatibility) between RCRA and CWA obligations; the district court failed to compare obligations and improperly resolved fact-intensive issues at pleading stage; remand for further proceedings |
| Whether Complaint states a § 6972(a)(1)(A) claim against the City (ongoing violation of a RCRA-derived permit/standard) | Complaint alleges City acted/omitted acts (leaky drums, excavating/mixing contaminated soils, exposing contaminants) making it an owner/operator of an unpermitted hazardous-waste facility and that violations are ongoing | City contends its actions were remedial removals and cannot constitute operating an unpermitted hazardous-waste facility or ongoing violation | Complaint adequately alleges ongoing violations (continuous/intermittent), tying conduct to RCRA standards; dismissal was erroneous; remand for development of facts and application of the specific regulations |
| Whether Complaint states a § 6972(a)(1)(B) claim against City and Maryland Chemical (contribution to imminent and substantial endangerment) | Alleged handling, storage, disposal, and past operations causing spills/releases contributed to present imminent/substantial endangerment | Defendants argued plaintiffs failed to allege active contribution or merely alleged remedial acts or passive leaks that do not show contribution | Court held Complaint sufficiently alleges "handling" and "disposal" (definitions broad) and that "contribute" requires active involvement or causal role; allegations against Maryland Chemical and City plausibly plead contribution and disposal; dismissal was erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir.) (describing RCRA’s cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme)
- Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (explaining RCRA’s purpose and private citizen enforcement under § 6972)
- Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (continuous or intermittent violation requirement for suits alleging a present violation)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (statutory limitations are jurisdictional only if Congress clearly states so)
- Verizon Md., Inc. v. PSC, 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (absence of a valid cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applying Twombly plausibility standard)
- Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846 (4th Cir.) (states may implement authorized hazardous-waste programs in lieu of federal program)