Bruce A. Sorenson v. State of Indiana, 133 N.E.3d 717

Bruce A. Sorenson was tried for repeated sexual abuse of two daughters (T.S. and J.S.) and a childhood friend (C.N.); the abuses spanned from the victims’ earliest years through their teens and included repeated anal and some vaginal penetration.
A jury convicted Sorenson on Counts 1–14 (child molesting and sexual misconduct with a minor); Count 15 was acquittal.
The trial court imposed consecutive maximum terms that totaled 590 years and found Sorenson a credit-restricted felon (one day of good-time credit for every six days served).
On appeal the court reversed Count 11 (sexual intercourse with T.S. when she was 14–16) because the only testimony of vaginal intercourse at issue placed the act at about age 11–12.
The Court held the trial court erred in applying the post–July 1, 2008 credit-time (credit-restricted felon) statutes to most counts as an ex post facto application, but affirmed application of the amended statute to Count 3 where the evidence placed repeated acts during the post-2008 window.
After reversing Count 11 and correcting credit-time application, the appellate court affirmed the remaining aggregate executed sentence of 570 years as not inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for Count 11 (sexual intercourse with T.S. at age 14–16)	State: testimony and inferences support conviction for vaginal intercourse in the charged age window.	Sorenson: T.S. only recalled possible vaginal intercourse at ~11–12, so State failed to prove the 14–16 element.	Reversed Count 11 conviction and its 20-year sentence because evidence did not show vaginal penetration when T.S. was 14–16.
Credit-restricted status / application of post-2008 credit-time statutes	State: amended statutes apply to make Sorenson a credit-restricted felon for the relevant convictions.	Sorenson: retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; many charged acts predate the 2008 amendments or involved victims older than the statute’s triggering age.	Reversed application of amended statutes to Counts 1,2,4–10,12–14 and remanded to apply the credit statutes in effect when those offenses occurred; affirmed that Count 3 supports credit-restricted status and amended statute applies to that count.
Aggregate sentence appropriateness (Rule 7(B))	State: facts and Sorenson’s conduct justify the extreme consecutive sentences; permanent removal from society warranted.	Sorenson: 570-year aggregate sentence is excessive and inconsistent with some prior multi-count child-molest cases.	Affirmed 570-year executed aggregate sentence; appellate review found no compelling basis to revise the sentence under Rule 7(B).

B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322 (Ind. 2018) (standard for sufficiency review)
Gaby v. State, 949 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (retroactive application of amended credit-time statutes violates ex post facto)
Upton v. State, 904 N.E.2d 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (same)
Sharp v. State, 970 N.E.2d 647 (Ind. 2012) (context for temporal proof of repeated acts)
Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391 (Ind. 1999) (jail credit applied against aggregate sentence)
Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2003) (Appellate Rule 7(B) authority and principles)
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 2008) (deference to trial court sentencing judgment)
Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111 (Ind. 2015) (Rule 7(B) framework and rare nature of appellate revision)
Guzman v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (focus on nature and depravity of offense when assessing sentence appropriateness)