266 So. 3d 777
Ala. Crim. App.2017Background
- In 2004 James Ben Brownfield was convicted of three counts of capital murder for killing his sister, her grandson, and brother-in-law; jury recommended death (11–1) and the trial court imposed death. Direct appeals and certiorari were denied; judgment finalized in 2010.
- Brownfield filed a timely Rule 32 petition (2011) raising juror misconduct, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct; the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and later adopted the State’s proposed order nearly verbatim and denied relief.
- At trial defense attacked the voluntariness/truthfulness of Brownfield’s confession and presented expert testimony about drug-induced delirium (Xanax and methamphetamine); defense pursued a false‑confession/innocence strategy in guilt phase and drug‑intoxication mitigation in penalty phase.
- At the Rule 32 hearing evidence showed a juror (B.J.) had been a victim of a 2000 theft/burglary and had been interviewed by police but did not disclose that during voir dire; defense counsel’s voir dire notes ranked that juror as a likely strike if known.
- Brownfield alleged trial counsel were ineffective for (1) choosing a reasonable‑doubt/false‑confession defense over a Xanax‑induced‑rage intoxication defense in the guilt phase and (2) failing to conduct a sufficiently thorough mitigation investigation for penalty phase; he also alleged appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising an involuntary‑intoxication instruction issue.
- The court applied Strickland and Alabama Rule 32 standards, reviewed the evidentiary record and expert testimony presented at trial and at the Rule 32 hearing, and affirmed the denial of the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Circuit court adopted State’s proposed order verbatim | Adoption shows lack of independent judicial review; typographical/adversarial language proves reliance on State product | Prior decisions recognize courts may adopt proposed orders; findings remain court’s if not clearly erroneous | No reversible error; order was the court’s independent judgment and not clearly erroneous |
| Juror misconduct (failure to disclose being a crime victim) | Juror B.J. omitted during voir dire that she had been interviewed as a crime victim; counsel would have struck her; defendant might have been prejudiced | Question was ambiguous, temporal remoteness limited impact, another victim‑juror sat, no proof counsel would have used a peremptory strike | Denial affirmed: nondisclosure was ambiguous and not shown to have probably prejudiced Brownfield |
| Ineffective assistance — guilt phase (choice of defense) | Counsel unreasonably abandoned intoxication defense; a Xanax‑induced‑rage defense could have reduced conviction to manslaughter or acquitted | Counsel investigated intoxication, retained experts, reasonably chose to attack confession (false‑confession strategy) supported by independent evidence; strategic choice | Denial affirmed: counsel’s choice was a reasonable, strategic decision and not constitutionally deficient |
| Ineffective assistance — penalty phase (mitigation investigation) | Mitigation investigation was rushed; defense presented limited mitigation; additional evidence (family history, abuse, substance disorders) would have been compelling and changed sentencing | Much of proposed additional mitigation was cumulative of trial mitigation; aggravating factors were strong; no reasonable probability outcome would differ | Denial affirmed: additional evidence was largely cumulative and would not have altered the balance favoring death |
| Ineffective assistance — appellate counsel (involuntary intoxication instruction) | Appellate counsel failed to raise trial court error in denying an involuntary‑intoxication jury instruction | Record is silent as to appellate counsel’s strategic reasons; without testimony of appellate counsel presumption of reasonable performance controls | Denial affirmed: Brownfield failed to overcome presumption of reasonable appellate strategy |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing the two‑pronged ineffective assistance test)
- Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So.2d 763 (Ala. 2001) (standard and factors for juror nondisclosure prejudice)
- Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (requiring reweighing of total mitigation against aggravators for Strickland prejudice in death cases)
- Ex parte Ingram, 51 So.3d 1119 (Ala. 2010) (discussing adoption of proposed orders and limits on such practice)
- McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (verbatim adoption of proposed order does not alone prove lack of independent judicial judgment)
- Bui v. State, 717 So.2d 6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (summarizing Strickland application and standards for counsel performance)
- Ex parte Jenkins, 105 So.3d 1250 (Ala. 2012) (order adoption reversible only when record shows lack of independent judgment)