Brown v. WENEROWICZ
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24300
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Brown was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime; he exhausted state remedies and filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition alleging unreasonable Strickland application by the Pennsylvania courts.
- The district court granted habeas relief after an evidentiary hearing, concluding counsel’s failure to develop alibi evidence prejudiced Brown; the Commonwealth appealed.
- The Labor Day 1998 shooting in Philadelphia involved eyewitness identifications of Brown and physical evidence tying clothing, a car, and a traffic citation to him.
- Brown claimed misidentification and an alibi; alibi witnesses Bright, Miller, and Johnson testified at trial; the alibi witnesses Osborne and Szmyt were excluded due to Pa. R.Crim.P. 567 notice issues.
- PCRA proceedings added statements from alibi witnesses and affidavits; the district court found El Shabazz’s failure to file alibi notices prejudicial and awarded relief, which the Third Circuit later scrutinized under Pinholster.
- The Third Circuit held that under Pinholster, the district court should not have conducted an evidentiary hearing and reversed the district court’s grant of the writ, returning to review the state-court record under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the evidentiary hearing was proper under Pinholster | Brown contends the district court properly expanded the record to examine Strickland against new evidence. | Commonwealth argues Pinholster prohibits new evidence and de novo fact-finding when the claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court. | Evidentiary hearing improper; Pinholster controls |
| Whether the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland in prejudice assessment | Brown asserts trial counsel’s alibi omission prejudiced the defense under Strickland. | Commonwealth contends the alibi witnesses were either not prejudicially useful or their testimony would be cumulative. | No unreasonable application; no prejudice shown |
| Whether excluded alibi witnesses would have changed the outcome | Osborne and Szmyt could have corroborated alibi timing, undermining the state's timeline. | Even if admitted, their testimony would have been largely cumulative and not sufficiently exculpating given other evidence. | Excluded evidence would have been cumulative; insufficient probability of different result |
| Whether the district court’s prejudice analysis relied on improper inference | District court erred in inferring timelines from fragments to conclude a reasonable probability of innocence. | State courts were entitled to deference; the record supports reasonable inferences drawn at trial. | Deference due; no reasonable probability of different outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Pinholster v. Ayers, 131 S. Ct. 1398 (2011) (limits §2254(d)(1) review to the state-court record)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (unreasonable application under AEDPA requires fair-minded disagreement)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (AEDPA deference philosophy and de novo review framework)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for deficient performance and prejudice)
- Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (prejudice standard requires reasonable probability, not mere possibility)