Brown v. United States Parole Commission
190 F. Supp. 3d 186
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Raymond Brown III was convicted in D.C. Superior Court (1992) and sentenced to 3–15 years; later consecutive convictions extended his aggregate term.
- Brown was first paroled in 1996, revoked in 1998 after a new conviction, then reparoled in December 2000 with a recalculated expiration date (November 30, 2015 at that time).
- In April 2008 the U.S. Parole Commission issued a violator warrant; Brown accepted an expedited decision in June 2008 revoking parole, rescinding ~8 years of street-time credit, and setting a brief re‑parole date in August 2008; he waived a revocation hearing and appeal.
- Brown filed a habeas petition (2014) claiming the Commission unlawfully extended his sentence, violating separation of powers, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The Commission argued it lawfully exercised statutory authority over D.C. Code offenders and applied controlling D.C. law requiring forfeiture of street time at the time of revocation.
- The district court denied relief, holding the Commission acted within jurisdiction and that separation of powers, double jeopardy, and ex post facto claims fail.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Separation of powers | Brown: Commission "re-sentenced" him and usurped judicial power | Commission: Parole revocation and conditions are administrative execution of sentence under D.C. law | Court: No usurpation; Commission acts administratively and does not offend separation of powers |
| Double jeopardy | Brown: Revocation and rescission of street time constitute successive punishment | Commission: Revocation continues original sentence; not a new prosecution or additional jeopardy | Court: Double jeopardy inapplicable; parole revocation is part of original sentence execution |
| Ex post facto | Brown: Application of (federal) Commission guidelines and rescission retroactively increased punishment | Commission: Rescission of street time returned Brown to pre-release position and the controlling D.C. statute requiring forfeiture predated his offense | Court: No ex post facto violation—rescission did not increase punishment and forfeiture rule existed before offense; later 2009 amendment is not retroactive |
| Procedural waiver/ineffective assistance claim | Brown (in reply): Counsel coerced him into accepting expedited decision; therefore waiver invalid | Commission: Brown knowingly accepted and waived hearing/appeal; no constitutional right to counsel at parole revocation so ineffective-assistance claim fails | Court: Waiver stands; coercion/ineffective-assistance argument insufficient to warrant habeas relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Goode v. Markley, 603 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting challenges to aggregation of consecutive sentences for parole eligibility)
- United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (parole revocation does not implicate double jeopardy as increase of a final sentence)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (post-revocation sanctions treated as part of initial penalty avoids double jeopardy problems)
- U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Noble, 693 A.2d 1084 (D.C. 1997) (interpreting D.C. statute to require forfeiture of street-time credit upon parole revocation)
- Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204 (D.C. 2001) (confirming the continued applicability of the forfeiture rule under D.C. law)