Brown v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs
3:20-cv-00063
S.D. Miss.May 7, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Jerry Brown, a former Marine, was treated at the VAMC for kidney cancer that metastasized to his lungs and sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence and medical malpractice after VA benefit denials.
- Brown received dialysis at the G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery Dialysis Clinic operated by the VAMC in Jackson, Mississippi.
- The Clinic notified patients it would close and transition all patients to community dialysis providers, with the transition expected to conclude by May 15, 2021.
- Brown moved for a three-year preliminary injunction to stop the Clinic’s closure, citing concerns about the VA’s research into community providers, possible overcrowding, adequacy of care, and COVID-19 protections.
- The Government argued the injunction request was unrelated to Brown’s underlying malpractice/negligence claims and lacked merit; the Court evaluated the four-factor preliminary-injunction standard.
- The Court denied the preliminary injunction because Brown’s requested relief was not sufficiently related to his complaint and, even on the merits, he failed to show a substantial likelihood of success or non-speculative irreparable harm.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the requested preliminary injunction is sufficiently related to the underlying FTCA malpractice/neglect claims | Brown: VA’s alleged negligent transition to community providers continues the pattern of negligence in his complaint | Gov: The PI addresses clinic closure/transition, a matter separate from claims about diagnosis/treatment | Court: PI must relate to complaint; Brown’s PI concerns dialysis-transition issues not pleaded in complaint, so the request is unrelated and cannot be granted |
| Likelihood of success on the merits | Brown: VA negligent in researching/selecting community providers; transfer may worsen care | Gov: No proof VAMC was negligent or that receiving provider is inadequate | Court: Brown failed to show substantial likelihood of success; factual bases differ and evidence is lacking |
| Irreparable harm / COVID exposure risks | Brown: risk of inferior care, overcrowding, and greater COVID-19 exposure justify injunctive relief for three years | Gov: Risks are speculative; pandemic is waning with vaccinations; no clear imminent harm | Court: Harms are speculative and insufficient to justify extraordinary relief, especially a three-year injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief and requires showing likelihood of success and irreparable harm)
- Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (four-factor preliminary injunction standard)
- Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must satisfy all injunction factors)
- Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1990) (district court looks to substantive-law standards in assessing likelihood of success)
- Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001) (court evaluates plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits for PI requests)
- Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queens’ Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2015) (PI should grant relief of the same character that may be granted finally)
- Middleton-Keirn v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (preliminary injunction preserves the status quo pending adjudication)