Brown v. United States
131 Fed. Cl. 540
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs own land in Cleveland County, NC adjacent to a railroad right-of-way; they allege the United States effected a taking by issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) under the Trails Act without paying just compensation.
- Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability, relying on Federal Circuit precedent (e.g., Ladd) that issuance of a NITU can constitute a physical taking.
- Defendant moved to stay proceedings pending resolution of the Federal Circuit appeal in Caquelin, where it seeks en banc review to overturn or limit Ladd and to recharacterize NITU-only claims as regulatory takings or address accrual timing.
- Defendant argued a stay would conserve judicial and party resources and avoid potentially unnecessary briefing if Caquelin changes the governing law; it also suggested (in reply only) allowing negotiations to continue.
- Plaintiffs opposed the stay, arguing Caquelin will not control here, that the Federal Circuit has addressed these questions previously, and that a stay would prejudice them by delaying compensation.
- The Court denied the stay, finding defendant did not show clear hardship or inequity justifying delay, whereas plaintiffs would suffer concrete prejudice from postponement; the Court set an expanded briefing schedule for cross-motions on summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether to stay proceedings pending the Federal Circuit’s Caquelin appeal | A stay is unnecessary and prejudicial; existing Federal Circuit precedent (Ladd) controls and delaying damages is harmful | A stay is warranted because Caquelin may change controlling law and conserve resources | Denied — defendant failed to show clear hardship; plaintiffs would be prejudiced by delay |
| Legal effect of a NITU (physical vs. regulatory taking and accrual) | NITU issuance is a physical taking under binding precedent (Ladd) | Caquelin may reclassify NITU-only claims as regulatory takings or alter accrual, so litigation should wait | Applied existing precedent now; Caquelin uncertainty alone doesn’t justify stay |
| Whether the possibility of additional briefing after Caquelin constitutes hardship | Plaintiffs: potential additional briefing doesn’t justify staying; they should proceed | Defendant: avoiding duplicative work and conserving resources justifies staying | Denied — speculative future briefing is not a clear hardship |
| Whether procedural differences in other cases (e.g., Phillips, Sauer West) counsel for/against stay | Plaintiffs: government selectively stalls similar cases; Phillip’s stay shows inconsistent treatment | Defendant: other cases are not similarly situated; court has stayed some matters | Court: prior stays elsewhere are not persuasive; procedural differences exist and do not compel a stay |
Key Cases Cited
- Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (U.S. 1936) (stay-of-proceedings standard; courts balance competing interests)
- Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (U.S. 1997) (party seeking stay bears burden; courts weigh prejudice from delay)
- Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (limits on stays; prejudice from delay risks impairing plaintiffs’ claims)
- Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (NITU issuance can constitute a physical taking)
- Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (U.S. 1962) (courts should pursue expeditious disposition of cases)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (U.S. 2009) (standard for appellate stays; discussed but held inapplicable here)
- SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (arguments not raised in opening brief are waived)
- Novosteel SA v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reply briefs cannot raise new issues)