Brown v. State, 361 P.3d 124

Background

In Feb 2011 Keith Scott Brown pleaded guilty to one count of child sodomy (1st degree) and two counts of sexual abuse of a child (2nd degree); he was sentenced March 31, 2011 to concurrent indeterminate terms (10 years to life on the first‑degree count). He did not file a direct appeal.
In Nov 2012 Brown filed a "motion for misplea" asserting his pleas were involuntary because he had been on prescription pain medication and had not told counsel; the district court denied it and an appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Certiorari to state and U.S. Supreme Courts were denied.
On Nov 25, 2013 Brown filed a petition for post‑conviction relief (PCRA) alleging ineffective assistance (misadvice about likely parole/release, multiple conflicts of interest) and involuntary pleas due to medication and counsel’s misinformation.
The district court found the facts supporting Brown’s claims were known to him at or before sentencing and concluded the PCRA petition was untimely and procedurally barred; Brown argued accrual should run from when he recognized the legal significance of those facts.
The court applied an objective discovery standard (analogous to federal habeas accrual jurisprudence) and held accrual began when Brown knew or should have known the evidentiary facts, not when he later appreciated their legal significance; because his cause of action accrued by May 2, 2011, the Nov 2013 PCRA was untimely.
Brown’s alternative egregious‑injustice argument was unpreserved; his challenge to plea voluntariness was also procedurally barred because he failed to move to withdraw the plea before sentencing.

Issues

Issue	Brown's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Timeliness / accrual of PCRA claims	Accrual should run from when Brown recognized the legal significance of facts (when he later learned parole dates and realized counsel’s advice was false)	Accrual runs when the petitioner knew or should have known the evidentiary facts; allowing subjective discovery would eviscerate limitations	The court held accrual is objective: when evidentiary facts were known or discoverable, not when legal significance was later recognized; petition untimely.
Ineffective assistance — counsel’s alleged misadvice about release	Counsel told Brown he would serve only ~2–3 years because counsel would influence the Board	Brown was informed of mandatory minimums, State’s recommended 10–to‑life sentence, and the court warned of long incarceration; factual predicate was known earlier	Claims are time‑barred because the evidentiary facts were known before sentencing/within limitations period.
Ineffective assistance — conflicts of interest	Counsel had potential conflicts (daughter’s business dealings, possible witness, family relation, firm’s media concerns) that impaired representation	Brown knew or could have known these facts earlier; no showing they were undiscoverable	Court held conflict facts were known or discoverable pre‑sentence; IAC claims untimely.
Voluntariness of plea due to medication / egregious‑injustice exception	Plea involuntary because Brown was on prescription pain medication and therefore incompetent; alternatively, egregious‑injustice should excuse procedural bars	Brown had six weeks between plea and sentencing to move to withdraw plea; egregious‑injustice argument was not raised below and is unpreserved	Plea‑voluntariness claim procedurally barred for failure to move to withdraw before sentencing; egregious‑injustice argument unpreserved, not addressed on appeal.

Key Cases Cited

Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas accrual runs from when factual predicate is discoverable, not when prisoner recognizes legal significance)
Taylor v. State, 270 P.3d 471 (Utah 2012) (standard of review for denial of post‑conviction relief)
Loose v. State, 135 P.3d 886 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (PCRA is collateral, not a substitute for direct appeal)
Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (clients may not be expected to recognize professional negligence immediately)
State v. Brown, 300 P.3d 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam) (prior appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)