Brown v. State, 17-1271

In April 2013 Brown was charged with 12 counts of sexual battery (2001–2012 time frame) and one count of incest; the State later nol-prossed Counts 1–11 and in May 2015 filed an amended information with three counts.
Count 1 alleged sexual battery occurring Feb 1–29, 2012; Count 2 alleged lewd or lascivious sexual battery occurring between Jan 1, 2001 and Dec 31, 2007; Count 3 alleged incest through Feb 29, 2012.
Brown was convicted on all three counts and sentenced: Count 1 (30 years), Count 2 (15 years consecutive), Count 3 (sentence not detailed here).
At sentencing the State flagged that Count 2 might be time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to lewd or lascivious battery; defense counsel told the court her research indicated the statute did not bar Count 2.
Appellate counsel did not raise the statute-of-limitations issue on direct appeal; Brown later petitioned for habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
The court found Count 2 was barred by the statute of limitations, that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue was deficient and prejudicial under Strickland/Bevel, and ordered resentencing without Count 2; the other ineffective-assistance claims were denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that Count 2 was time‑barred	Brown: Count 2 alleged acts ending by Dec 31, 2007, so the 3‑year statute expired long before the 2015 amended information; counsel’s omission was deficient	State: Count 2 was a continuation/connected to earlier sexual battery counts and not barred (citing Douglas)	Held: Appellate counsel was ineffective; failure had no tactical justification and caused prejudice; relief granted as to Count 2
Whether Count 2 survived as part of a series/continuation of charges so statute of limitations did not apply	Brown: Count 2 not a continuation of Count 12 or other charged conduct	State: Count 2 was sufficiently connected to earlier counts to avoid the statute of limitations	Held: Court disagreed with State; Count 2 was a separate offense under a different statute and was time‑barred
Whether prejudice existed from counsel’s omission	Brown: Sentence (15 years consecutive) shows obvious prejudice	State: (argued continuation theory to avoid showing prejudice)	Held: Prejudice established—vacatur of Count 2 and remand for resentencing on Counts 1 and 3
Whether other ineffective‑assistance claims merit relief	Brown: raised two additional claims on appeal	State: no reversible error	Held: Other claims denied; petition granted in part and denied in part

Bevel v. State, 221 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 2017) (standard for assessing ineffective assistance on appeal)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
State v. Douglas, 919 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (continuation/connection doctrine invoked by State to argue limitations tolled)