Brown v. State
170 A.3d 829
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2017Background
- On Aug. 16, 2014, homeowner discovered a basement window forced open and a blood smudge on the inside; about $12,000 in property (including a bicycle) was stolen.
- Police took the blood sample from the window and searched CODIS; two CODIS hits matched Ibrahim Brown — both profiles were collected in Washington, D.C. (one from a misdemeanor sexual-assault conviction, one from a separate investigation).
- Based on the CODIS matches the State obtained a warrant and collected a buccal swab from Brown; the swab matched the window blood.
- Brown moved in limine to exclude DNA evidence, arguing the D.C. samples would not have been lawfully collected under Maryland’s DNA Collection Act, so they could not provide probable cause to compel his sample; the circuit court denied the motion.
- After a bench trial the court found Brown not credible, inferred he saw a bicycle through the window, found he entered the house with intent to steal (and was liable as an accomplice), and convicted him of first-degree burglary and theft; Brown appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CODIS matches based on out-of-state DNA that would not be collectible under Maryland law may furnish probable cause to obtain a Maryland warrant | Brown: CODIS hits derived from samples that would have been unlawfully collected under Maryland’s DNA Act cannot supply probable cause to compel a sample in Maryland | State: The Act does not bar reliance on legally collected out-of-state samples or CODIS hits; Act is silent about extra‑territorial collection and aims to participate in CODIS | Court: Affirmed — out‑of‑state CODIS matches lawfully collected under that jurisdiction may establish probable cause; the Maryland Act does not exclude such evidence |
| Whether the trial court clearly erred in inferring Brown saw a bicycle and in discrediting his testimony (sufficiency of evidence / accomplice liability) | Brown: The court relied on an erroneous factual finding (that he testified he saw a bicycle) and ignored his testimony that he closed the window, so evidence was insufficient | State: Court reasonably inferred Brown looked into the basement (bicycles were visible), could infer intent to steal, and was entitled to disbelieve Brown’s exculpatory claims | Court: Affirmed — inference supported by circumstantial evidence; credibility determinations left to trial court; evidence sufficient for convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Dickerson v. Longoria, 414 Md. 419 (de novo review for statutory interpretation)
- Dixon v. State, 302 Md. 447 (bench-trial sufficiency standard; findings not set aside unless clearly erroneous)
- Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65 (MESA exclusionary rule; evidence inadmissible in Maryland if inconsistent with state interception statute)
- Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620 (finding not clearly erroneous if supported by competent material evidence)
- CashCall, Inc. v. Md. Comm’r of Fin. Regulation, 448 Md. 412 (statutes must have reasonable interpretation; avoid absurd results)
- State v. Rice, 447 Md. 594 (legislative history may be consulted as confirmatory in statutory interpretation)