Brown v. State
2016 Ark. App. 616
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- William Lamar Brown was tried and convicted by a Jefferson County jury of two counts of kidnapping, second-degree battery, and second-degree escape; sentences were imposed and this appeal followed.
- Brown has a long history of schizophrenia; multiple forensic evaluations during the proceedings diagnosed mental disease but ultimately concluded he was competent to stand trial and capable of forming requisite culpable mental states at the time of the offenses.
- At trial Brown testified he sought help for schizophrenia; the State objected to testimony and lay-witness testimony (mother and friend) about his schizophrenia was excluded by the circuit court as irrelevant because Brown had not pleaded an affirmative mental-disease defense.
- Brown’s counsel proffered that Brown, his mother, and a friend would testify regarding his history of schizophrenia and its role in the February 21, 2013 incident; the court nonetheless excluded that evidence and instructed the jury to disregard Brown’s mental-health testimony.
- The jury convicted; on appeal Brown argued exclusion of lay-witness evidence of his mental disease violated Arkansas Code § 5-2-303 because such evidence is admissible to show whether the defendant had the culpable mental state required for the charged offenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of lay evidence of mental disease to negate culpable mental state | Brown: § 5-2-303 allows evidence of mental disease to prove lack of required culpable mental state without pleading affirmative insanity defense | State: Evidence irrelevant absent a timely affirmative defense of mental disease or defect; exclusion proper | Reversed: Exclusion was an abuse of discretion; lay evidence of mental disease admissible to challenge formation of culpable mental state |
| Whether defendant had to plead an affirmative mental-disease defense before introducing mental-disease evidence | Brown: Not required to plead affirmative defense to introduce evidence under § 5-2-303 | State/Court below: § 5-2-303 applies only after pleading affirmative defense | Court: § 5-2-303 permits evidence to show culpable mental state even if affirmative defense not pled; exclusion improper |
| Prejudice from exclusion | Brown: Entire defense depended on excluded evidence; exclusion was prejudicial | State: (Implicit) No reversible prejudice shown | Court: Prejudice shown—exclusion deprived Brown of his failure-of-proof defense; reversal required |
| Scope distinction between lay and expert evidence on mental condition | Brown: Lay testimony about mental disease is admissible to show inability to form intent | State: Expert evidence of mental disease not admissible absent affirmative defense (per prior cases) | Court: Distinguishes lay testimony (admissible re: intent under Graham/§5-2-303) from expert insanity opinions; here lay testimony exclusion was erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. State, 290 Ark. 107, 717 S.W.2d 203 (1986) (reversible error to exclude lay testimony about defendant’s mental/emotional condition when purposeful intent was an essential element)
- Bruner v. State, 426 S.W.3d 386 (Ark. 2013) (distinguishes admissible lay testimony on culpable mental state from inadmissible expert insanity evidence when affirmative defense not pled)
- Catlett v. State, 900 S.W.2d 523 (Ark. 1995) (explains distinction between failure-of-proof and affirmative excuse defenses such as insanity)
- Stewart v. State, 870 S.W.2d 752 (Ark. 1994) (expert opinion required to establish general insanity; specific intent at a time is for jury to decide)