Brown v. State
340 P.3d 1020
Wyo.2015Background
- Gregory Brown was tried on four child-sexual-abuse counts arising from alleged contact with his stepdaughter A.I. and a separate recorded incident with another minor; jury convicted him of attempted second-degree sexual abuse (Count III) and acquitted on the other three counts.
- Voir dire included several potential jurors who revealed personal histories of sexual abuse; one venireman (J.R.) blurted in open court that Brown "should be locked up." J.R. was excused for cause; other emotional jurors were also excused after bench or in-chambers questioning.
- Instruction for Count III initially described only that Brown “did an act” constituting a substantial step toward sexual abuse; counsel did not object during the instruction conference when the instruction lacked specificity.
- During deliberations the jury asked whether Count III referred to a specific act; over Brown’s objection the court supplemented the instructions to state the element meant “attempting to touch [A.I.’s] vaginal area,” language mirroring the Information.
- Sentencing occurred 1 year and 17 days after conviction following multiple continuances for motions, presentence work, evidentiary and scheduling issues; Brown moved to dismiss for violation of speedy-sentencing principles, which the court denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a mistrial was required because a potential juror said defendant “should be locked up” and other venire members became emotional during voir dire | Brown: the outburst and visible emotion contaminated the venire and denied him an impartial jury | State: the juror was excused and the court gave curative instructions; emotional venire members were excused and did not prejudice the panel | Court affirmed denial of mistrial: curative measures and excusals cured any prejudice; acquittals on other counts supported lack of systemic bias |
| Whether the court impermissibly invaded the jury’s factfinding by supplementing instructions to specify the act charged in Count III | Brown: the supplemental instruction improperly directed the jury to facts and invaded the jury’s province | State: clarification was legal guidance, tracked the Information, and remedied juror confusion about which act Count III charged | Court affirmed: supplemental instruction properly clarified the law (which act was charged) in response to jury confusion and did not improperly state facts |
| Whether sentencing 1 year + 17 days after conviction violated Brown’s right to speedy sentencing/due process | Brown: delay was presumptively unreasonable under Yates and required dismissal | State: a variety of legitimate factors (motions, presentence work, E 404(b) issues, scheduling), many continuances attributable to defense, justified delay | Court affirmed denial of dismissal: State met its burden to excuse delay; no prejudice shown and court did not abuse discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1995) (venireman’s substantive extrajudicial accusation required remedial action and supported mistrial where no curative measures were taken)
- Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 2000) (distinguishing Miller where venireman’s general opinion was followed by prompt excusal and curative instructions)
- Heywood v. State, 170 P.3d 1227 (Wyo. 2007) (trial court must answer jury questions clarifying which alleged act corresponds to each count; refusal can be prejudicial)
- Snow v. State, 216 P.3d 505 (Wyo. 2009) (court may not answer jury questions in a way that directs them to specific factual findings supporting conviction)
- Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1990) (established presumptively unreasonable delay for sentencing exceeding one year absent State justification)
- Roesch v. State, 196 P.3d 795 (Wyo. 2008) (applying Yates; State can excuse delay by showing legitimate causes, including defendant-attributable continuances)
- Schade v. State, 53 P.3d 551 (Wyo. 2002) (delay excused where much of the postponement resulted from defendant’s requests and the court’s efforts to secure alternatives before sentencing)