BROWN v. SMITH AND SOLOMON COMMERCIAL DRIVER TRAINING (PHILADELPHIA), 2:19-cv-01533

Background

Pro se plaintiff Jason L. Brown sued Smith & Solomon Commercial Driver Training, PA CareerLink Suburban Station, and PennDOT Driver and Vehicle Services after failing a commercial driver's license test he took after WIOA-funded training.
Brown alleges defendants conspired to deprive him of a commercial license and violated his First Amendment rights; he claims mechanical problems with the test vehicle caused his failure and blames the training provider for supplying/maintaining the vehicle.
He originally filed a Complaint dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8 and failure to state a claim, was granted leave to amend, and then filed an Amended Complaint repeating similar allegations and several motions.
Court construed the Amended Complaint as asserting § 1983 claims for First Amendment violations and evaluated whether defendants acted under color of state law and whether Brown plausibly pleaded a conspiracy or constitutional violation.
Court found CareerLink and PennDOT are not proper § 1983 defendants (state/agency/programmatic entities immune or not suable), Smith & Solomon is a private entity without plausible state-action allegations, and Brown alleged only bare conspiracy assertions and no plausible First Amendment violation.
Court dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice (no leave to amend) and denied Brown's pending motions as futile; any state-law claims were dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether PennDOT and CareerLink are suable "persons" under § 1983	Brown treats them as state actors liable under § 1983 for depriving him of a license	PennDOT is a state department and CareerLink is a state program or non-entity; Eleventh Amendment bars suit	Dismissed: states/agencies not "persons" under § 1983 and Pennsylvania has not waived immunity
Whether Smith & Solomon is a state actor	Brown argues relationship to state-funded program and testing transforms the trainer into a state actor	Trainer is a private company and provision of training/testing nexus to state requirements insufficient	Dismissed: no plausible state action under controlling tests (exclusive function, joint action, interdependence)
Whether Brown pleaded an actionable conspiracy under § 1983	Brown alleges defendants conspired to deny his license and pressured him into training	Defendants argue allegations are conclusory and lack facts showing an agreement	Dismissed: bare conspiracy assertions fail Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard
Whether facts alleged state a First Amendment violation	Brown claims his free speech/expression rights were violated by the conspiracy and training/testing practices	Defendants contend no facts show infringement of protected speech or a constitutional deprivation	Dismissed: allegations do not plausibly allege any First Amendment or other constitutional violation
Whether leave to amend is warranted	Brown sought to vacate prior dismissal and submitted additional exhibits	Court considered futility given repeated deficiencies and lack of plausible constitutional claim	Denied: further amendment would be futile; dismissal with prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (frivolousness standard for in forma pauperis dismissal)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard; plausibility required)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (conspiracy allegations must plead facts supporting agreement)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (elements of a § 1983 claim: constitutional violation by state actor)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (states and state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983)
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626 (Third Circuit tests for state action)
Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337 (state-action analysis guidance)
Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (no fundamental right to drive)