Brown v. Smith
827 F.3d 609
7th Cir.2016Background
- Jack Brown worked 28 years for City of Anderson Transit System (CATS); developed insulin-dependent diabetes and lost ability to maintain a commercial driver’s license (CDL).
- He held non-driving positions (dispatcher, mechanic’s helper, later street supervisor) during which the lack of a CDL was tolerated; supervisors knew of his CDL inability when promoted to street supervisor.
- Street-supervisor job description listed possession of a CDL, but Brown and others testified supervisors rarely had to drive and replacement drivers were quickly available.
- Brown was terminated in 2012 with the stated reason that he could not obtain a CDL; he then started a trailer-hauling business which later failed and began collecting SSDI.
- Brown sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act for failure to accommodate; jury found for Brown on the ADA claim and awarded damages; district court denied summary judgment for the City.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether possession of a CDL is an essential function of the street-supervisor job | Brown: CDL was not essential; supervisors rarely drove and others covered driving duties | City: Job description showing CDL requirement establishes it as essential as a matter of law | The essential-function inquiry is factual for the jury; evidence supported jury finding that CDL was not essential |
| Whether the district court should have decided essential-function on summary judgment | Brown: Essential-function is factual and cannot be decided as a matter of law here | City: Job description and employer judgment entitle it to judgment as a matter of law | Court: Essential-function is factual; City waived Rule 50(b) challenge by not moving post-verdict; summary judgment inappropriate |
| Whether jury instruction including "time spent performing the function" was proper | Brown: Time-spent is a relevant factor under regulations and jury could weigh it | City: Time-spent is irrelevant where function is emergency-only or core to business; model instruction silent on time metric | Instruction was proper; 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(3) supports time-spent as relevant and allowing the jury to weigh it was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether Brown reasonably mitigated damages by starting a hauling business | Brown: Self-employment was a reasonable mitigation attempt tied to his skills; he made substantial efforts before failing | City: Brown failed to seek other comparable transit employment or reasonably mitigate | Court: Trial evidence showed reasonable mitigation; self-employment counts and City failed to show likely comparable work was available |
Key Cases Cited
- Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing factual disputes from pure questions of law for appealability)
- Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (U.S. 2011) (sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges require proper post-verdict motions)
- Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (U.S. 2006) (Rule 50(b) preserves sufficiency challenges after trial)
- Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2015) (similar facts; essential-function inquiry is factual and job descriptions are only one factor)
- Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001) (consideration of multiple §1630.2(n) factors in essential-function analysis)
- Smith v. Great Am. Restaurants, Inc., 969 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1992) (self-employment can constitute reasonable mitigation)