Brown v. Raines, 293 A.3d 1116

Background

Brown owns and lives in a three-bedroom townhouse in Northeast D.C.; since 2008 she rented one upstairs bedroom to Yolanda and Whitfield Raines and they share common areas (kitchen, living room, one upstairs bathroom).
The parties’ relationship deteriorated after the Raineses filed a 2016 housing-conditions complaint and requested an inspection; Brown then served a 90-day notice seeking possession for her “personal use and occupancy as a dwelling.”
A first eviction action was dismissed on the ground that a statutory presumption of retaliation applied and Brown could not rebut it; she appealed and the dismissal was affirmed.
Brown filed a second eviction action under D.C. Code § 42-3505.01(d) again claiming she needed the room for immediate personal use; at deposition she testified she wanted more space and would use the room for storage, occasional sleeping, or telework but gave no detailed plan.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Raineses, finding Brown had no “concrete plan” for dwelling use and therefore could not rely on § 42-3505.01(d).
The D.C. Court of Appeals vacated that summary judgment, holding that in a shared-house context a landlord need not identify a detailed plan for every room but must still prove good faith; the case was remanded to evaluate whether Brown’s claim is pretextual.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Brown)	Defendant's Argument (Raineses)	Held
Whether § 42-3505.01(d) requires a concrete, room-by-room plan to evict for "immediate and personal use and occupancy as a dwelling"	No; in a shared-house Brown need only intend to annex the room into her dwelling and need not specify exact uses	Yes; Brown’s vague testimony shows no real immediate need and fails the statutory requirement	The court held a concrete plan is not required in this shared-house context; intent to make the room part of her dwelling can suffice
Whether shared common areas change the proof required under § 42-3505.01(d)	Brown: shared-house occupancy means expansion of living space is a legitimate dwelling use without more detail	Raineses: shared use intensifies need to show specific decreased traffic or concrete need	Held: Shared-house context removes the requirement of a detailed plan; annexation into existing dwelling is enough
Whether Brown’s vagueness is evidence of bad faith or pretext for eviction	Brown: testimony about needing more space shows genuine intent	Raineses: lack of specifics supports inference of pretext and vindictive motive	Held: Vagueness can be considered in the good-faith inquiry; trial court must determine whether claim is pretextual — summary judgment was premature
Whether summary judgment for the Raineses was appropriate	Brown: disputed factual issues about intent and good faith preclude summary judgment	Raineses: testimony is legally insufficient so judgment was proper	Held: Summary judgment reversed; remand for trial court to address good-faith/pretext factual disputes

Key Cases Cited

Gould v. Butler, 31 A.2d 867 (D.C. 1943) (pretext and flimsy showings should not oust tenants; landlord intent and good faith are central)
Brauer v. O’Daniel, 47 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1946) (owner’s intent to occupy building as a home can satisfy dwelling-use exception)
Manogue v. Heilbroner, 63 A.2d 876 (D.C. 1949) (landlord’s changed circumstances supporting need for possession—e.g., live-in nurse—recognized but change is not a required showing)
Staves v. Johnson, 44 A.2d 870 (D.C. 1945) (good-faith requirement emphasized; dominant purpose to evict defeats claim)
Dant v. Forsythe, 81 A.2d 84 (D.C. 1951) (owner moving back after sale supports dwelling-use claim in appropriate circumstances)
Redshift, LLC v. Shaw, 264 A.3d 1182 (D.C. 2021) (summary judgment reviewed de novo)
Bailey v. District of Columbia, 668 A.2d 817 (D.C. 1995) (on summary judgment the record and inferences are viewed in favor of non-moving party)
Adm’r of Veterans Affs. v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 1985) (tenant-protection statutes construed liberally)