Brown v. Ogbolu, 331 S.W.3d 530

Brown filed a restricted appeal from a post-answer default judgment against him on Allied's counterclaims arising from a construction project.
Allied asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, a $5,000 promissory note, and theft; Brown, pro se, sued Allied on Oct 31, 2007.
Allied served the counterclaim under Rule 21a, with a certificate of service; Brown challenged whether service was valid.
Brown did not appear at the October 1, 2008 trial; the court entered a default judgment against Brown on Oct 6, 2008.
Brown learned of the judgment more than 90 days after it was signed; he filed a motion for new trial and to extend deadlines on Feb 3, 2009, which the court denied.
The court held the record shows factual insufficiency to support the $20,000 breach-of-contract damages and remanded for further proceedings on that claim and related relief; pleadings necessitated remand on the promissory-note and theft claims as well.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was service of the counterclaim valid on Brown?	Allied's certificate of service suffices under Rule 21a.	Brown argues service was defective due to missing date on the blank and other certificate issues.	Presumption of service stands; Brown failed to rebut on the face of the record.
Is the breach-of-contract damages award factually sufficient to support the default judgment?	Brown breached the contract; Allied incurred damages of $20,000.	Evidence shows inadequate causation and uncertain amounts; damages overstated.	Evidence is factually insufficient; reverse and remand on breach of contract and related attorney's fees.
Do the pleadings support the promissory-note and theft-damages claims, or require remand?	Note and theft claims are pleaded and supported by testimony.	Damages pleadings are inconsistent or exceed what was pleaded; May exceed pleaded amounts.	Remand appropriate on promissory note and theft claims in the interests of justice.
Did Rule 306a(4) bar post-judgment extensions based on late notice of judgment?	Rule 306a(4) limitations apply; timely extension possible if notice within 90 days of judgment.	Notice occurred after 90 days; extensions were improper.	Post-judgment deadlines cannot be extended; Brown timely pursued restricted appeal but relief on merits granted.

Norman Commc'ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1997) (restricted appeal record includes all papers; extrinsic evidence not allowed)
Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2009) (error must appear on the face of the record in restricted appeals)
Levit v. Adams, 850 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1993) (actual knowledge after 90 days does not restart 306a(4) period)
Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., 722 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1986) (default judgments cannot award damages beyond pleadings)
Mullen v. Roberts, 423 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1968) (default judgment must align with pleadings; error may warrant remand)
Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009) (restrictive appeal; remand when necessary for full development of case)
Jackson v. Biotectronics, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Houston 1996) (pleadings must provide notice and jurisdiction; resolve ambiguities via justice)