Brown v. New York City Department of Education
755 F.3d 154
| 2d Cir. | 2014Background
- Brown, a 2006 NYC public‑school graduate, worked at Banana Kelly High School from fall 2007 to Dec. 2010 performing supervision, detention, phone duties, report distribution, and later some mentoring; typically ~40 hours/week.
- He was recruited by Banana Kelly staff after mentioning prior unpaid mentoring; principal Laub created a "volunteer internship" because Brown lacked qualifications for paid work.
- Brown was never told he would be paid, repeatedly asked for paid positions, and received only sporadic small cash gifts ($40–$60 on a few occasions), occasional MetroCards, and meals.
- Brown sued the NYC DOE under the FLSA for unpaid minimum and overtime wages; he later added a NY Labor Law claim against Laub. District court granted summary judgment for DOE, concluding Brown was a public‑agency volunteer.
- On appeal, Brown challenged only the volunteer/employee determination; the Second Circuit reviewed de novo (viewing facts most favorably to Brown) and affirmed summary judgment for DOE.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown was an "employee" under the FLSA or a public‑agency "volunteer" exempt from wage requirements | Brown argued factual disputes (hours, payments, promises) preclude deciding volunteer status as a matter of law | DOE argued statutory/regulatory volunteer criteria are satisfied and no reasonable jury could find Brown was an employee | Court held volunteer status is a question of law here and, on the totality of circumstances, Brown was a public‑agency volunteer; summary judgment for DOE affirmed |
| Whether mixed motives (resume building plus civic motives) defeat volunteer status | Brown contended he acted (at least partly) for personal gain; mixed motives should preclude volunteer classification | DOE argued Congress/DOL did not require exclusive civic motives; mixed motives are permissible | Held that mixed motives do not bar volunteer status; statutory/regulatory text and intent allow non‑exclusive motivations |
| Whether there was ‘‘promise, expectation, or receipt’’ of compensation that would negate volunteer status | Brown claimed Laub’s budget/search statements, grant application, and sporadic cash/benefits created a promise/expectation/receipt of pay | DOE argued statements were speculative (not promises), Brown’s expectation was not objectively reasonable, and payments were nominal/expenses | Held no promise or objectively reasonable expectation of pay; receipts (cash, MetroCards, meals) were nominal/expense‑type and did not convert status to employee |
| Whether Brown’s services were coerced or involuntary | Brown testified sometimes he felt he had no choice to come in when asked | DOE maintained Brown volunteered freely; any compulsion was subjective conscientiousness, not employer coercion | Held services were provided freely and without coercion as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., 726 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (FLSA’s "employee" definition is construed broadly)
- Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (U.S. 1947) (early Supreme Court discussion distinguishing volunteers from employees)
- Purdham v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 637 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2011) (mixed motives do not necessarily defeat volunteer status)
- Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, Tex., 388 F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 2004) (volunteer determination may be decided as a legal question)
- Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308 (2d Cir. 2012) (economic‑realities factors inform FLSA status inquiries)
- Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984) (economic‑realities factors for employer/employee status)
- Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (U.S. 1985) (benefits like room and board can constitute wages)