Brown v. Maxwell Dershowitz v. Giuffre
929 F.3d 41
| 2d Cir. | 2019Background
- Plaintiff Virginia Giuffre sued Ghislaine Maxwell for defamation arising from public allegations linked to Jeffrey Epstein’s conduct; extensive discovery produced many sealed filings.
- The district court issued a broad Sealing Order allowing parties to file materials under seal; about 167 docket entries were sealed, including the entire summary judgment record.
- Third parties (Alan Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich, and the Miami Herald/Julie Brown) intervened seeking unsealing of varying portions of the record; the district court denied those unsealing motions in several orders.
- The Second Circuit reviewed whether the district court applied the correct public‑access presumptions and whether it performed individualized, on‑the‑record findings to justify sealing.
- The panel concluded the district court failed to conduct particularized review, ordered immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record (with minimal redactions), and remanded for individualized review of the remaining sealed materials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary‑judgment materials enjoy a strong presumption of public access | Giuffre: privacy interests justify sealing given sensitive allegations | Maxwell/District Ct: denial of summary judgment reduces presumption; sealing warranted to protect privacy | Court: Summary‑judgment filings carry a strong First Amendment presumption of access; sealing requires specific on‑the‑record findings and narrow tailoring — unseal ordered |
| Whether district court may treat all discovery/sealing requests collectively without individualized review | Giuffre: broad sealing order was appropriate to protect privacy and victims | Intervenors: district court ceded sealing control to parties and failed to review documents individually | Court: Generalized sealing orders are improper; court must review sealed items individually and make specific findings |
| Whether non‑dispositive materials (discovery, motions in limine) are judicial documents subject to public access | Giuffre: many discovery filings were not relied on and implicated privacy, so low or no presumption | Intervenors: such filings are relevant to judicial function and carry at least a substantial presumption | Court: Discovery and evidentiary filings relevant to judicial functions carry a lesser—but still substantial—presumption; district court must balance privacy with access on an item‑by‑item basis and remand for review |
| Proper tools for courts to protect privacy/reputation without wholesale sealing | Giuffre: sealing was the appropriate protective method | Intervenors: courts should use narrower tools | Court: Courts should use protective orders, motions to strike, Rule 11 sanctions, narrow redactions, and other supervisory measures rather than broad sealing when possible |
Key Cases Cited
- Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (courts have supervisory power over records to prevent use for scandal)
- Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (strong presumption of access for summary‑judgment materials; sealing requires specific findings)
- United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (defining when materials qualify as "judicial documents")
- United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) (distinguishing weight of access presumption for different documents)
- SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) (protective orders and balancing privacy against public access)
- United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) (relevance standard for documents impacting judicial functions)
- Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713 (N.Y. 2015) (New York litigation privilege and limitation requiring materiality and pertinence)