622 F.Supp.3d 786
N.D. Cal.2022Background
- Madison Reed marketed its at-home hair color as "free of harsh chemicals" (e.g., "free of ammonia, resorcinol, PPD") on packaging, website, and ads.
- Brown (California) bought kits in early 2016, Sept. 3, 2017, and Mar. 10, 2018, later alleging hair brittleness and loss after use.
- Sheffler (Ohio) bought kits in Feb. 2021 after viewing a commercial and website pages; she experienced scalp irritation and hair loss.
- Plaintiffs allege Madison Reed replaced ammonia, resorcinol, and PPD with ethanolamine, 2-methylresorcinol, and PTDS, which they claim are not safer.
- Procedurally: this was Brown’s third pleading iteration (SAC); Madison Reed moved to dismiss; Court dismissed all claims with prejudice and denied further leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Choice of law for Sheffler's consumer claims | Sheffler relied on Madison Reed's California-based terms selecting California law; California law should apply | Hyundai/Mazza framework: claims arise from advertising (not contract), so governmental-interest test applies and Ohio law governs | Ohio law governs because Sheffler's transaction and last event (reliance/purchase) occurred in Ohio; CLRA/FAL/UCL claims dismissed for lack of applicable law |
| Statute of limitations (Brown) | Brown relied on multiple purchases over 2016–2018; later purchases save claims from time-bar | Madison Reed: earlier purchases (2016) fall outside limitations periods for CLRA/FAL/UCL | 2016 purchases/time-barred; Sept. 3, 2017 purchase actionable only under UCL; Mar. 10, 2018 purchase actionable under CLRA, FAL, and UCL; equitable-tolling allegations insufficient |
| Sufficiency of misrepresentation claims | Advertising and packaging falsely implied products are "healthier/safer/gentler" despite replacement chemicals | Statements like "Salon-quality" are puffery; "free of" statements are factually true and not misleading absent additional false claims | Most marketing slogans are non-actionable puffery; "free of" statements are true and, on these facts, would not mislead a reasonable consumer into believing overall product is safer; Brown and Sheffler fail to plead actionable misrepresentations |
| Omission / duty to disclose and leave to amend | Plaintiffs say Madison Reed omitted that replacements were not safer and concealed risks | Madison Reed disclosed replacement ingredients on label/website; no duty to disclose beyond that; plaintiffs already had multiple amendment opportunities | No actionable omission because replacement chemicals were disclosed; plaintiff Brown had repeated chances to cure—leave to amend denied; claims dismissed with prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012) (governs governmental-interest choice-of-law analysis for consumer fraud claims)
- Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.4th 459 (Cal. 1992) (framework for enforceability of contractual choice-of-law provisions)
- In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2019) (distinguishes contract-based claims from advertising-based claims for choice-of-law purposes)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard and rejecting conclusory allegations)
- Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939 (Cal. 2002) (truthful statements can still be actionable if actually misleading or likely to deceive)
- Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasonable consumer standard for consumer protection statutes)
- Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018) (framework for when omissions create a duty to disclose)