Brown v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government, 3:16-cv-00460

Background

Percy Brown was prosecuted in Kentucky based on various criminal charges, including murder, following his refusal to cooperate with a police check-forging investigation.
Multiple indictments were brought and dismissed against Brown over more than a decade, resulting in him spending over seven years in jail.
Brown alleged that police officers fabricated evidence and framed him, specifically linking Jewell to a December 2004 interrogation central to the murder indictment.
Brown filed a federal action, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and related theories after the charges were dismissed.
The district court dismissed Brown's § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim related to the murder charge as time-barred, finding it accrued when the murder indictment was dismissed in February 2015; Brown appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When did the statute of limitations accrue for § 1983 malicious prosecution arising from the murder charge?	Limitation period began only when all charges were dismissed in April 2016, as they were part of a single sequence of prosecutions.	Limitation period began when the murder charge and its associated counts were dismissed in February 2015, as those charges were separable from others.	The limitations period began with dismissal of the murder charge in February 2015; claim is untimely.
Do overlapping or sequential indictments delay accrual of the malicious prosecution claim?	Charges were part of a single ongoing conspiracy, so accrual should be delayed until final dismissal.	Each charge/indictment was a separable event and should be analyzed individually for accrual.	Each charge is separable; different indictments resolved on different dates; no delayed accrual.
Does the continuing-violation or conspiracy doctrine delay accrual of claims?	The continuing acts and shared conspiracy should postpone accrual of all claims.	The alleged acts were separate, and conspiracy theory does not combine them for accrual purposes.	Continuing-violation doctrine does not apply; separate actionable offenses.
Are the charges against Brown sufficiently intertwined to be treated as non-separable?	All charges part of a continuous prosecution and should accrue together.	Murder charge was based on distinct facts and victims from later indictments, thus separable.	The charges are separable, so the murder-based claim accrued with its dismissal.

Key Cases Cited

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (Section 1983's statute of limitations is borrowed from state law)
King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2017) (Malicious prosecution claim accrues upon favorable termination of criminal proceedings)
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022) (Favorable termination does not require affirmative indication of innocence)
McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1988) (Existence of conspiracy does not delay accrual of separate actionable claims)
Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989) (Favorable termination for one charge can be separable from others for malicious-prosecution analysis)
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (In mixed-verdict cases, separability of charges determines accrual)