Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co.
297 Neb. 541
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Jacobsen owned a parcel of land in Banner County; about 80 acres of that parcel were fenced with adjacent land owned and claimed by Terry P. Brown (the disputed property).
- Brown filed a quiet title action claiming adverse possession and recorded a lis pendens before Jacobsen closed on a sale of the parcel to the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission (the State).
- The State acquired the property by warranty deed after the lis pendens was recorded and moved to intervene in Brown’s action; the district court allowed intervention over Brown’s objection.
- The district court ruled the State was a “subsequent purchaser” under Nebraska’s lis pendens statute, limited the State’s role, and prohibited the State from presenting evidence at trial on the adverse possession claim.
- Jacobsen withdrew from the litigation and did not participate at trial; the trial court quieted title in Brown. The State appealed, arguing it was entitled to fully defend as an intervenor despite being a subsequent purchaser.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State was a "subsequent purchaser" under § 25-531 | Brown: lis pendens was validly recorded and thus the State, acquiring after recording, is a subsequent purchaser bound by the notice | State: disputes characterization or contends lis pendens could be canceled; but did not move to cancel below | Court: State is a subsequent purchaser because deed was executed/recorded after lis pendens was filed |
| Whether a subsequent purchaser who intervenes may present evidence to defend title | Brown: as a subsequent purchaser the State cannot "stand in the shoes" of Jacobsen to oppose adverse possession | State: as an intervenor it became a party and thus has all rights of a party, including offering evidence | Court: An intervening subsequent purchaser is a party and may fully participate and offer evidence; trial court erred in excluding State’s evidence |
| Whether lis pendens strips substantive defense rights from an intervenor | Brown: lis pendens prevents third parties from acquiring interests and limits rights of subsequent purchaser to what original seller had to convey | State: lis pendens is procedural and does not abrogate a party’s right to litigate interests when they intervene | Court: Lis pendens is procedural to protect notice/status quo; it does not restrict intervenor’s procedural rights to defend |
| Whether exclusion of State’s evidence was reversible error | Brown: exclusion was proper under lis pendens limits | State: exclusion prejudiced substantial rights because it prevented defense when original defendant withdrew | Court: Exclusion unfairly prejudiced State; reversal and new trial required |
Key Cases Cited
- Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204 (doctrine that subsequent purchaser takes subject to decree; subsequent purchaser may question plaintiff’s right to recover)
- Munger v. Beard & Bro., 79 Neb. 764 (lis pendens does not relieve plaintiff of naming known interested parties; subsequent purchasers known to plaintiff should be made parties)
- Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898 (discussion of lis pendens history and statute interpretation)
- Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, 293 Neb. 115 (standard for appellate review in equity actions)
- Martensen v. Rejda Bros., 283 Neb. 279 (standard for reversible error based on evidentiary rulings)