Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co.
297 Neb. 541
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Jacobsen owned land adjacent to Brown; about 80 acres of Jacobsen’s land was fenced with Brown’s (the disputed property).
- Brown filed a quiet title action alleging adverse possession and recorded a lis pendens before Jacobsen closed a sale of the disputed parcel to the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission (the State).
- The warranty deed to the State was executed after Brown’s lis pendens and recorded; the State moved to intervene and the district court allowed intervention over Brown’s objection.
- The district court held the State was a “subsequent purchaser” under Nebraska’s lis pendens statute and limited the State’s role, ruling the State could not present evidence challenging Brown’s adverse possession claim.
- Jacobsen withdrew from the case and did not participate at trial; the court quieted title in Brown. The State appealed, arguing it should have been allowed to fully defend as an intervenor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State was a subsequent purchaser under § 25-531 | Brown: Lis pendens recorded before deed; any later grantee is a subsequent purchaser bound by the action | State: Contended it held equitable title at filing and argued court erred re: status and/or should cancel lis pendens | Held: State was a subsequent purchaser because deed was executed/recorded after lis pendens; court did not consider cancellation (no district court motion) |
| Whether a subsequent purchaser-intervenor may fully participate and offer evidence | Brown: Subsequent purchaser has limited rights and cannot "stand in the shoes" of the original owner to attack adverse possession | State: As intervenor and party, it has rights to discovery, present evidence, and defend its interest | Held: Lis pendens does not strip an intervenor/subsequent purchaser of the procedural rights of a party; State entitled to present evidence; exclusion was error |
| Whether lis pendens confers or limits substantive rights of parties | Brown: Lis pendens limits what interest a subsequent purchaser acquires and thus limits defenses they may raise | State: Lis pendens is procedural notice; it does not bar a party from defending its interests in the litigation | Held: Lis pendens is procedural to protect status quo and give notice; it does not restrict an intervenor’s right to defend or present evidence |
| Whether exclusion of the State’s evidence was reversible error | Brown: Court discretion to limit evidence; exclusion justified by statutory status | State: Exclusion prevented meaningful defense and was not based on evidentiary rules | Held: Excluding all evidence solely because of lis pendens status unfairly prejudiced the State; reversal and remand for new trial warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204, 288 N.W.2d 826 (discussing lis pendens doctrine and effect on subsequent purchasers)
- Munger v. Beard & Bro., 79 Neb. 764, 113 N.W. 214 (lis pendens does not relieve plaintiff of joining known interested parties; subsequent purchasers should be allowed to litigate their rights)
- Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898, 852 N.W.2d 718 (statutory interpretation of lis pendens and related principles)
- Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, 293 Neb. 115, 876 N.W.2d 356 (standard of review in equity actions)
- Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (intervenor becomes a party and gains party rights)
- Merrill v. Wright, 65 Neb. 794, 91 N.W. 697 (purpose and scope of lis pendens statute)
- DeBoer v. Oakbrook Home Assn., 218 Neb. 813, 359 N.W.2d 768 (background on intervention principles)