Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co.
297 Neb. 541
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Jacobsen owned land in Banner County; about 80 acres (the disputed property) was fenced with adjacent land owned by Terry P. Brown, who sued to quiet title by adverse possession.
- Brown filed and recorded a lis pendens before Jacobsen closed a sale of the disputed parcel to the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission (the State); the deed was recorded after the lis pendens.
- The State moved to intervene, alleging record ownership (via purchase agreement/deed) and potential financial exposure; the district court permitted intervention over Brown’s objection.
- The district court treated the State as a “subsequent purchaser” under Nebraska’s lis pendens statute, allowed limited participation (filing an answer and offers of proof) but prohibited the State from presenting evidence or examining witnesses at trial on the adverse possession claim.
- Trial proceeded with Brown presenting evidence only; the court quieted title for Brown. The State appealed, arguing the lis pendens status did not bar full participation by an intervenor/subsequent purchaser.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Brown) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State is a subsequent purchaser under § 25-531 | Lis pendens was properly recorded before State's deed; State is a subsequent purchaser | The State disputed being so limited (alternative: sought cancellation) | Held: State is a subsequent purchaser; deed recorded after lis pendens so §25-531 applies |
| Whether a subsequent purchaser who intervenes may fully participate (discovery, present evidence) | Lis pendens limits a subsequent purchaser’s substantive rights; subsequent purchaser shouldn’t "stand in the shoes" of original owner to attack adverse possession | An intervenor becomes a party with all party rights and may defend its interest, including offering evidence | Held: Intervention makes the State a party entitled to full participation; lis pendens does not bar offering evidence |
| Whether the district court properly excluded the State’s evidence at trial | Exclusion appropriate because lis pendens limits defender to only the title Jacobsen could convey | Exclusion deprived the State of party rights and ability to defend; exclusion prejudiced substantial rights | Held: Exclusion was error that unfairly prejudiced the State; reversible error requiring new trial |
| Whether the lis pendens should have been cancelled (procedural challenge not raised below) | N/A – Brown did not move to cancel | State argued cancellation could be appropriate | Held: Court will not consider cancellation on appeal because State never moved for cancellation in trial court |
Key Cases Cited
- Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898, 852 N.W.2d 718 (Neb. 2014) (statutory interpretation of lis pendens is a question of law)
- Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, 293 Neb. 115, 876 N.W.2d 356 (Neb. 2016) (standard for de novo review in equity)
- Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204, 288 N.W.2d 826 (Neb. 1939) (a subsequent purchaser who intervenes may question plaintiff’s right to recover like the original defendant; lis pendens binds subsequent purchasers to judgment)
- Munger v. Beard & Bro., 79 Neb. 764, 113 N.W. 214 (Neb. 1907) (lis pendens does not relieve plaintiff of duty to make known interested parties parties to litigation; subsequent purchasers known to plaintiff must be made parties)
- Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (Neb. 1959) (intervenor under §25-328 becomes a party with the rights of a party)
- Martensen v. Rejda Bros., 283 Neb. 279, 808 N.W.2d 855 (Neb. 2012) (reversible-error standard for exclusion/admission of evidence in civil case)