Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co.
297 Neb. 541
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Jacobsen owned land adjacent to Brown; about 80 acres of Jacobsen’s land (the disputed property) had been fenced with Brown’s property.
- Brown filed a quiet title action alleging adverse possession and recorded a lis pendens before Jacobsen closed a sale of the disputed parcel to the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission (the State).
- The warranty deed from Jacobsen to the State was executed after the lis pendens and recorded thereafter; the district court found the State was a “subsequent purchaser.”
- The State moved to intervene; the court allowed intervention but limited the State’s role based on its subsequent-purchaser status and prohibited the State from offering evidence at trial on adverse possession.
- Jacobsen withdrew from participation; trial proceeded with Brown presenting evidence unopposed; the court quieted title to Brown. The State appealed, contending it should have been allowed to fully defend as an intervenor.
Issues
| Issue | Brown's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State is a "subsequent purchaser" under the lis pendens statute | Lis pendens was properly recorded; a subsequent purchaser who acquires after filing takes subject to the lis pendens | Argued it had equitable title earlier and questioned application, but did not contest procedural sufficiency of lis pendens | The State was a subsequent purchaser because its deed was executed/recorded after the lis pendens filing |
| Whether the State could intervene | Brown argued intervention improper or limited because lis pendens deprived State of interest | State argued it had a direct interest (record title/equitable title) and could be aggrieved by outcome | Court permitted intervention; Nebraska Supreme Court accepted intervention was proper |
| Whether a subsequent purchaser-intervenor can present evidence to defend against plaintiff's claim (adverse possession) | Brown contended the lis pendens status limited the State’s rights so it could not "stand in the shoes" of Jacobsen to contest adverse possession | State argued as intervenor and party it had the same procedural rights (discovery, present evidence, examine witnesses) to defend its interest | The Supreme Court held lis pendens does not strip an intervenor of party rights; the State should have been allowed to offer evidence |
| Whether exclusion of State’s evidence required reversal | Brown implied exclusion proper under lis pendens limitation | State argued exclusion prejudiced its substantial rights as a party | Reversed and remanded for new trial because preclusion of State’s evidence unfairly prejudiced its right to defend as an intervenor |
Key Cases Cited
- Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, 293 Neb. 115, 876 N.W.2d 356 (discussing appellate standard in equity cases)
- Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898, 852 N.W.2d 718 (statutory interpretation and lis pendens background)
- Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204, 288 N.W.2d 826 (a subsequent purchaser who becomes party may question plaintiff’s right to recover)
- Munger v. Beard & Bro., 79 Neb. 764, 113 N.W. 214 (lis pendens does not relieve plaintiff from making known interested parties parties to the action)
- Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (intervenor becomes a party with rights of a party)
- Merrill v. Wright, 65 Neb. 794, 91 N.W. 697 (purpose and scope of lis pendens)
- Sheasley v. Keens, 48 Neb. 57, 66 N.W. 1010 (historical discussion of lis pendens adoption)
- Martensen v. Rejda Bros., 283 Neb. 279, 808 N.W.2d 855 (standard for reversible evidentiary error)